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This Article provides a new way of organizing and thinking about one of 
the most important, useful, and ubiquitous—yet misunderstood, neglected, and 
underdeveloped—areas in all of law: remedies. Even though remedial issues 
are present in every case, too little theoretical attention has been paid to them, 
leaving a wide array of remedial doctrines—from injunctions to declaratory 
decrees, punitive damages to contempt, and unjust enrichment to specific 
performance—in search of a unifying theory. 
This Article offers such a theory. Specifically, it argues that the broad 
array of seemingly distinctive remedies, operating over diverse subject matter 
areas, can be organized and justified by way of four distinct but related 
remedial principles: the principles of restoration, retribution, coercion, and 
protection. Each principle focuses on either the victim or the wrongdoer, and 
does so from either an ex ante or ex post perspective. These principles, in turn, 
allow one to organize and unify a large swath of seemingly unique and 
unrelated remedies under a broad conceptual umbrella. 
More importantly, however, by showing that seemingly idiosyncratic 
remedies reflect larger remedial principles, it is my hope that this Article—by 
identifying and exploring the relationship between and among these 
principles—can help judges, practitioners, and policy makers think more 
clearly about what they are doing, as a descriptive matter, and ought to be 
doing, as a normative matter, when awarding and justifying any particular 
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remedy—a matter they must consider no less frequently than in every single 
case. 
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I. REMEDIAL DISUNITY: IDENTIFYING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS 
Though Solomon himself were to lay down the substantive law, 
though it were to satisfy every just demand of natural right and social 
policy, the law would be an imperfect instrument unless and until the 
remedies applicable were formulated with equal care.1 
 
– Charles Alan Wright 
In a seminal article written over half a century ago, Professor Charles Alan 
Wright lamented that although “[e]very litigated case, without exception, 
necessarily includes a question of remedy,” there was still—as recently as 
1955—“no law of remedies.”2 The scholar, judge, or practitioner interested in 
obtaining a bird’s-eye view of the field could find no single source where “the 
whole subject [was] put in perspective,” but was left to comb through separate 
treatises on “Damages, Equity, Specific Performance, Injunction, Quasi-
Contracts, Rescission, Declaratory Judgments, Restitution, and perhaps 
others”3 to gather shards from a broken field she would have to reconstruct for 
 
 1 Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 377 (1955). 
 2 Id. at 376; see also id. at 377 (“Civil actions are not brought to vindicate nice theories as to negligence 
or nuisance or consideration. They are brought because a person who has been injured, or is afraid he may be, 
wishes to prevent the injury or be redressed for it.”). 
 3 Id. at 376. There was, in short, “no place where [one could] find the whole subject put in perspective.” 
Id. Even today, students are confounded by the sheer number of remedies available for seemingly identical 
wrongs and are taught to think about (or memorize!) remedies in terms of a hodgepodge of rules regarding 
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herself. Even today, far too many lawyers and judges think about remedies as 
appendages to substantive fields, and talk in specific terms about “contract 
remedies,” “tort remedies,” or “remedies for unjust enrichment,” rather than 
more generally about the underlying remedial principles holding these 
seemingly disparate fields together. Fortunately, since the time of Professor 
Wright, many remedies scholars have begun to organize remedies along the 
lines of general remedial principles (e.g., “compensation,” “restitution,” or 
“punishment”),4 but even here, too little attention has been paid to the 
relationship that exists between and among these remedial principles; 
relationships that, if discovered, would help unify the field of remedies by 
highlighting the shared characteristics underlying all remedies in every 
substantive field. 
This Article attempts to fill this gap by making sense of the deep structure 
of remedies. Specifically, this Article develops a framework that identifies and 
unites these seemingly diverse remedial principles into a unified whole, and 
offers a new way to think about (and justify) what judges do (and ought to do) 
when awarding remedies. My claim is this: the ostensibly distinct remedies 
 
legal versus equitable remedies, contract versus tort damages, specific performance versus replevin, cost of 
completion versus diminution in value damages, expectation versus reliance damages, compensatory damages 
versus restitutionary versus punitive damages, injunctive versus declaratory relief, and they struggle to fit in 
other concepts such as contempt, nominal damages, accounting for profits, constructive trusts, equitable liens, 
subrogation, etc. The list of terms one is confronted with when endeavoring to understand the “subject” of 
remedies goes on and on. 
 4  For example, several modern remedies casebooks have revealed these connections to the student by 
organizing the material along functional lines. For instance, in his leading casebook, Professor Laycock not 
only discusses broad remedies categories that apply across many substantive fields (i.e., compensatory 
remedies, preventive remedies, restitutionary remedies, punitive remedies, and ancillary remedies), but also 
goes one step further and helpfully discusses two overarching theories, corrective justice and law and 
economics, which run throughout the law of remedies and have been offered by others as being capable of 
helping these broad general principles hang together in a coherent fashion. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxix, xxx, 3, 15–19 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he book reflects my 
belief that a course in remedies should not be a series of appendices to the substantive curriculum. It contains 
no chapters on remedies for particular wrongs or particular kinds of injury. Such chapters are important, but 
their place is in the substantive courses to which they pertain. This book attempts to explore general principles 
about the law of remedies that cut across substantive fields and that will be useful to a student or lawyer 
encountering a remedies problem in any substantive context.”); see also DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., REMEDIES: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, at vii (4th ed. 2006) (“The traditional organization of a remedies book subordinates the 
remedy to the substantive law, classifying the material in whole or in part by cause of action: remedies for 
damage to chattel, remedies for damage to land, remedies for breach of contract, etc. We believe that there is 
more to be learned by adopting a transsubstantive approach to remedies. By organizing the material around the 
remedy, and not the substantive law, our materials allow the professor and the student to explore the concerns 
that are common to remedial issues in whatever substantive context they arise.”).  
For a wonderful discussion of how remedies came to be thought of as its own field of law, see Douglas 
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161 (2008). 
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(e.g., expectation damages, injunctions, restitution, contempt, punitive 
damages) that reign over the vast terrain of seemingly unrelated substantive 
fields (e.g., torts, contracts, unjust enrichment, property, constitutional law) 
mostly fall into one (or more) broad remedial categories, which are themselves 
related, and serve to protect one (or more) discrete and well-defined “remedial 
interest(s).” Each remedial interest, in turn, focuses on either the victim 
(usually the plaintiff) or the wrongdoer (usually the defendant) from one of 
two temporal perspectives: an ex ante perspective, which focuses on remedies 
issued prior to the commission of a wrongful act (a preventive injunction, for 
example, would fall into this category), or an ex post perspective, which 
focuses on remedies issued after a wrongful act has been committed (an award 
of money damages, for example, would fall into this category). 
The remedial taxonomy developed above can be usefully mapped onto the 
following remedial matrix, to which I will refer throughout this Article. 
FIGURE 1: THE REMEDIAL MATRIX 
 




















In quadrant I resides the “restorative interest,” where the principle of 
restoration is paramount. Here, the law of remedies tends to be approached 
from an ex post, victim-oriented perspective and is concerned with making the 
plaintiff whole by restoring the victim of a wrongful harm to the position he or 
she occupied prior to the harm. The most common restorative remedy is an 
award of money damages (e.g., expectation damages),5 but in-kind relief, such 
as requiring a defendant to specifically perform a contract or to return stolen 
 
 5  LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 4.  
JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:38 AM 
1314 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1309 
goods (e.g., through the writ of replevin), would fall under this category as 
well.6 
In quadrant II resides the “retributive interest,” which views remedies from 
an ex post, wrongdoer-oriented perspective and tends to reflect society’s desire 
to punish wrongdoers (usually in accordance to the severity of their wrong) for 
the harms they have inflicted. Punitive damages is probably the most obvious 
example of a remedy falling into quadrant II, although, as this Article will 
argue in a future section,7 any remedy that forces a defendant to unwillingly 
transfer to another something to which he or she asserts a recognizable 
property interest could constitute retributive punishment. Thus, for instance, 
the body of law governing unjust enrichment, which attempts to take from the 
defendant the very thing (or its value) he or she has taken from the plaintiff 
would largely fall into quadrant II. 
In quadrant III resides the “coercive interest.” This remedial interest takes 
an ex ante, wrongdoer-oriented approach to remedies and reflects society’s 
interest in ensuring that potential future wrongdoers are both deterred (i.e., 
negative coercion) from committing socially inefficient acts and incentivized 
(i.e., positive coercion) to commit socially productive acts. Insofar as punitive 
damages are designed to deter future wrongdoers rather than punish a 
particular wrongdoer, they provide a good example of negative coercion. An 
example of positive coercion would be, for instance, a court’s sanction of 
coercive civil contempt to compel a party to comply with a court order. 
Finally, in quadrant IV resides the “protective interest,” which seems to be 
the least appreciated and developed of the four remedial interests, though 
arguably the most important, for reasons that will be discussed later in this 
Article.8 This interest approaches remedies from an ex ante, victim-centered 
perspective and reflects society’s desire to protect potential victims from 
threatened transgressions before any harm occurs. Although negative 
injunctions (i.e., injunctions requiring an adjudicated wrongdoer to refrain 
from engaging in a prohibited activity) provide the quintessential example of a 
remedy falling within this category, I hope to show by the end of this Article 
that many (if not most) remedies already serve, to a greater or lesser extent, 
 
 6  Id.  
 7  See infra Part II.B.  
 8  See infra Part II.D. 
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this basic remedial interest and should therefore be crafted with this most 
fundamental remedial interest in mind.9 
Given the discussion above, we can now update the previous remedial 
matrix as follows: 
FIGURE 2: THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS 
 




















With this chart before us, my thesis can now be set forth in two parts. First, 
this Article argues that all of the remedies with which we are familiar (e.g., 
expectation damages, specific performance, punitive damages, injunctions, 
contempt, and restitution), in addition to the vast array of remedies at a judge’s 
disposal, can generally be understood as advancing one (or more) of these 
remedial interests. This is the focus of Part II of this Article where each 
remedial interest is explored in some depth. 
Second, Part III of this Article argues that this organization reveals the 
following important and previously unappreciated relationship between and 
among these remedial interests: that in a bipolar litigation model, in which the 
victim is made whole by the wrongdoer,10 a remedy located within any given 
quadrant will not only accomplish the goals unique to the quadrant within 
which it is located, but will also have predictable effects on the subsequent 
quadrant as well. Thus, for instance, a remedy designed to advance quadrant 
I’s restoration interest (e.g., paying to the victim a sum of money as 
compensatory damages) will also advance quadrant II’s retributive interest, 
because retributive justice will require that the sum paid to the victim be taken 
 
 9  See infra Part III.A. 
 10  As opposed, for example, to a victim being made whole by a special master administering a victim 
compensation fund. 
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from the adjudicated wrongdoer’s pocket to make the victim whole. This 
quadrant II payment, in turn, will provide some measure of deterrence against 
other potential wrongdoers who are thinking about engaging in such costly 
behavior, thereby advancing the interests located in quadrant III (i.e., negative 
coercion). And this deterrence, in turn, will afford a certain measure of 
protection to similarly situated potential victims, thereby paying homage to the 
values located within quadrant IV’s protective interest. By this account then, 
every remedy will tend, to a greater or lesser extent, toward the protection 
interest located within quadrant IV, if only indirectly. This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
FIGURE 3: THE REMEDIAL PATHWAY 
 




















Before proceeding further, it is worth pausing to make a few observations. 
First, it is useful to note that the remedial interests reflected in quadrant I (the 
restorative interest) and quadrant III (the coercive interest) are at the forefront 
of the well-known debate in the private law between corrective justice 
scholars,11 on the one hand, who emphasize that remedies ought to provide just 
compensation to the victims of wrongful conduct,12 and law and economics 
scholars,13 on the other hand, who emphasize that remedies ought to be chosen 
to efficiently deter potential future wrongdoers.14 The taxonomy also helps us 
readily identify a similar tension that pervades the criminal law, where heated 
 
 11  See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and 
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 357 (1992). 
 12  LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 16. 
 13  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1–4 (1987); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981); Richard A. 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
 14  LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 17. 
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debate has raged for centuries between those who have argued that punishment 
can only be justified on retributive grounds15 (quadrant II) and those who have 
argued that punishment, as an evil to be avoided where possible,16 can only be 
justified when it has the salutary effect of deterring future crimes17 (quadrant 
III). In both of these instances, the taxonomy presented above reveals that 
scholars and judges holding fast to their understanding of an issue have little 
chance of coming to an agreement with members of an opposing camp about 
the resolution of difficult remedial problems (hence, the centuries-long debates 
in these areas) not because one side is “wrong,” or unreasonable, or unwilling 
to come to terms with its ideological adversary, but because each side is 
focusing on different personal and temporal aspects of the remedial problems 
before them! Stated differently, each side is arguing, in effect, about different 
pieces of the same remedial puzzle, and too little emphasis is paid to the shared 
remedial purpose that is (indirectly), and ought to be (directly), the focus of 
most of these remedies: protecting potential victims! 
 
 15  See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 100 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1952) (1821) (“[P]unishment is regarded as containing the criminal’s right and hence by being 
punished he is honoured as a rational being. He does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and 
measure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he receive it if he is treated either as a 
harmful animal who has to be made harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him.”); IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887) (“Juridical 
Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another Good either with regard to the 
Criminal himself or to Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it 
is inflicted has committed a Crime. . . . The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps 
through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the 
Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it . . . .”); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of 
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 
181–82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders 
deserve it. Moral culpability (‘desert’) is in such a view both a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of 
liability to punitive sanctions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. 
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789) (“[A]ll punishment in itself is evil.”); see also 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651) (“A Punishment, is 
an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same 
Authority to be a Transgression of the Law . . . .”). 
 17  Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (“The great end of punishment is not the expiation or 
atonement of the offence committed, but the prevention of future offences of the same kind.”); BENTHAM, 
supra note 16, at 165 (noting punishment should be administered “to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and 
worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever”); WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 383–85 (West & Richardson, 8th American ed. 1815) (“The proper end of human punishment is, 
not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention of crimes.”); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF 
LEGAL PUNISHMENT 29 (1966) (“[T]raditional utilitarians hold that punishment can be justified only by 
reference to prevention of crime.”). 
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This Article proceeds by laying bare each piece of the remedial puzzle by 
examining each remedial interest in some detail. In the course of doing so, this 
Article attempts to show the manner in which these remedial interests are 
related to one another, and explores the consequences of this relationship for 
the law of remedies. Finally, this Article offers some concluding thoughts not 
only on the protective interest, but also on the law of remedies as a whole. 
II. REMEDIAL PLURALISM: EXPLORING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS 
A. The Restorative Interest 
In seeking to identify a principle or set of principles by which the law of 
remedies might be organized, perhaps no notion comes more readily to mind 
than that of “mak[ing] the victim whole.”18 Since the dawn of time—or at least 
since unregulated blood feuds were replaced by organized systems of 
“composition” and money damages19—it has been a truism of private law 
adjudication that a party legally wronged by another shall have a right of 
redress against the wrongdoing party.20 The right of redress for a harm that has 
already occurred, of course, is necessarily a backward-looking remedy that 
focuses on the victim’s interest in restoration (quadrant I). Such relief may, in 
turn, take one of two forms: substitutionary (i.e., where some replacement, 
usually money damages, is given as a substitute for the thing lost) and in-kind 
relief (i.e., where the exact thing that was taken from the victim is given back 
to him or her). 
Compensatory damages is the most common form of substitutionary 
restoration awarded by judges, and is probably the most common of all private 
law remedies.21 In its most basic form, this “basic principle underlying 
common law remedies [states that remedies] shall afford only compensation 
for the injury suffered.”22 The amount of compensation, however, is not merely 
a matter of discretion to be decided upon by a judge or jury; the remedy 
 
 18  Indeed, this notion stretches back all the way to the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 B.C.) and has been 
with us since. See, e.g., Stephen Schafer, Victim Compensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 55, 55 
(1970). 
 19  See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation 
of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 82–83 (1995); see also S. B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64–65 (3d ed. 1965). 
 20  See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 1. 
 21  See, e.g., Schafer, supra note 18, at 56–57, 63. 
 22  See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 63 (1930) (“[T]he basic principle underlying common 
law remedies [is] that they shall afford only compensation for the injury suffered . . . .”). 
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should, so far as possible, restore the injured party to his or her rightful 
position.23 
The benefit of such a principle is twofold. First, in an ideal world with a 
well-functioning market, an award of compensatory damages will, in many 
cases, allow a party who has been deprived of some right (e.g., the victim’s car 
has been stolen) to purchase an exact equivalent in the open market (e.g., a 
new car),24 which, after compensation, would make it “as though” the victim 
were never injured.25 This is so because the award of money damages should 
make the victim indifferent between the preservation of the right, on the one 
hand, or its deprivation plus a compensatory sum, on the other.26 
Second, this principle allows us to make sense of a broad range of 
seemingly distinct remedies: Whether we are speaking generally about 
damages across a broad range of substantive fields (e.g., contracts and torts),27 
or specifically about particular damages awarded within a given substantive 
field (e.g., expectation, reliance, and restitution damages in contracts; pain and 
suffering damages in torts; and restitution and disgorgement damages in unjust 
enrichment), by couching these seemingly distinct remedies in terms of more 
general principles, one can go a long way not only toward uniting this 
otherwise chaotic array of individual remedies, but can also provide each 
remedy with a degree of theoretical coherence and legitimacy that can help 
solve similar remedial problems. 
 
 23  United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental principle of damages 
is to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for 
the wrong of the other party.”).  
 24  See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 22 (“In functioning markets, giving plaintiffs the value of what they 
lost implements the rightful position by enabling plaintiffs to replace the thing they lost. Plaintiffs may choose 
to spend the money some other way, but so long as the choice is theirs, there is no reason to doubt that they 
have been made whole.”). 
 25  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 491 (5th ed. 2008). A perfectly 
restorative substitutionary remedy would make the victim indifferent between the preservation of the right at 
issue, on the one hand, and the deprivation of the right at issue plus a specific compensatory sum, on the other. 
 26  See, e.g., id. (“Perfect compensation is a sum of money that leaves the victim indifferent between the 
injury with compensation or no injury.”). Of course, there are some injuries for which money damages will 
always be inadequate, ranging from wrongful death, at one end of the spectrum, to the loss of goods to which 
the owner attaches some unique, idiosyncratic value (e.g., a family heirloom), at the other end. For these types 
of injuries, the court employs the irreparable injury rule to protect the injured party with a property rule 
whenever possible. See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 380–81. 
 27  See, e.g., Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Refining & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The point 
of an award of damages, whether it is for a breach of contract or for a tort, is, so far as possible, to put the 
victim where he would have been had the breach or tort not taken place.”). 
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Indeed, the claim that one of the main purposes of remedies is to 
compensate victims for the harms they have suffered may seem too banal to 
merit discussion. It is. But I am not concerned with a general failure among 
judges, commentators, or litigants to underemphasize the importance of 
compensatory remedies. Rather, it is the opposite problem with which I am 
concerned: the importance of compensatory remedies is much too frequently 
overemphasized by commentators and judges alike,28 much to the detriment of 
other important remedial goals. 
Overemphasizing compensatory remedies is problematic for several 
reasons. First, it may cause us to overlook the fact that remedies can and 
should serve other principles beyond merely providing “compensation for the 
injury suffered.”29 In fact, these other principles are at least as important and, 
in some cases, more important than a principle that seemingly focuses 
exclusively on compensatory damages would seem to indicate.30 Too narrow a 
focus on compensatory damages, therefore, may cause one to misunderstand 
the nature of many remedies. 
The second problem is, as suggested in the beginning of this section, that 
compensatory damages are not even the be-all, end-all restorative remedy and 
should (at the very least) be thought of alongside other in-kind restorative 
remedies that, contrary to popular perception,31 are both more basic—and more 
commonly preferred by judges, commentators, and litigants themselves—than 
the traditional emphasis on compensatory damages would indicate.32 
 
 28  See, e.g., O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing 
else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable 
to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.”). 
 29  Cf. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 63 (1930) (“[T]he basic principle underlying common law 
remedies [is] that they shall afford only compensation for the injury suffered . . . .”). 
 30  These principles will be taken up infra in Part II.B–D. 
 31  See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 
Press 1963) (1881) (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is called compelling specific 
performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one. The only universal consequence of a legally 
binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to 
pass.”). 
 32  See id.; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (4th ed. 
2010) (“Plaintiff’s right to the property through replevin casts doubt on claims that Anglo-American law 
reflects a preference for substitutionary relief over specific relief . . . .”); id. at 391 (arguing that the irreparable 
injury rule is dead, in that “whenever the choice of remedy matters to [the] plaintiff, the rule is satisfied”); see 
also USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 14–15 (Del. Super. Ct.) (“[F]or the remedy 
at law to prevail, the remedy at law must be: available as a matter of right; full, fair and complete; and as 
practical and efficient to the ends of justice as the equitable remedy. This is a very practical standard which 
favors equity in cases where the Plaintiff for good reason seeks relief other than money damage.” (citations 
JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:38 AM 
2013] REMEDIAL CONSILIENCE 1321 
It is often the case, for example, that although a plaintiff seeks to be 
restored to his or her rightful position, substitutionary restorative remedies 
(i.e., compensatory damages) simply will not do, perhaps because the 
substitutionary remedy is itself inadequate,33 perhaps because a court has 
decided that even where money damages are adequate, a right-holder ought to 
be entitled to something more fundamental than a mere award of compensatory 
damages,34 or perhaps because, quite simply, the plaintiff desires specific 
relief35 and the court can find no reason why it ought to be denied.36 Where 
one or more of these factors are present, a party will often request that he or 
she be restored in-kind to his or her rightful position and a court will frequently 
oblige.37 
In any event, even where substitutionary restorative remedies (e.g., 
compensatory damages) are combined with in-kind restorative remedies (e.g., 
 
omitted)), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) (mem.); Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 
756, 759 n.2 (N.Y. 1986) (“While the usual remedy in Anglo-American law has been damages, rather than 
compensation ‘in kind,’ the current trend among commentators appears to favor the remedy of specific 
performance, but the view is not unanimous.” (citations omitted)). The court in USH Ventures went on to note 
that remedies are merely “choices to solve problems,” and called for the abolition of the “hierarchy between 
law and equity.” Id. at 15. 
 33  See, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Intra Brokers, Inc., 24 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[F]or 
equitable relief to be appropriate, there must generally be no adequate legal remedy.”).  
 34  See, e.g., Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82, 84 (W. Va. 1911) (noting that, although the 
irreparable injury rule may “permit[] a mere trespasser to utterly destroy the forest of his neighbor, provided he 
is solvent and able to respond in damages to the extent of the value thereof,” such a rule is contrary to the 
“general principles of English and American jurisprudence,” which “guarantee to the owner of property the 
right, not only to possession thereof and dominion over it, but also its immunity from injury”). 
 35  See, e.g., Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 436 P.2d 32, 35 (Okla. 1967) (allowing recovery of 
personal property under the legal remedy of replevin, without regard to whether the irreparable injury rule is 
satisfied, although the defendant offered to pay fair market value of the goods withheld). Replevin is now a 
generally available remedy for contracts for the sale of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (2011) (allowing specific 
performance not only where “the goods are unique,” but also “in other proper circumstances”); id. § 2-716(3) 
(specifically mentioning replevin). 
 36  See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82–83 (3d Cir. 1948) (paying homage to the 
traditional rule that “[a] party may have specific performance of a contract for the sale of chattels if the legal 
remedy is inadequate,” but noting that there is “no reason why a court should be reluctant to grant specific 
relief when it can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming processes against one 
who has deliberately broken his agreement,” and denying specific performance on other grounds). 
 37  See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 746 (1974) (“[T]he scope of the [injunctive] remedy 
is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. . . . [T]he remedy is necessarily designed, 
as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied 
in the absence of such conduct.”); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY 
RULE 23 (1991) (“Courts do not deny specific relief merely because they judge the legal remedy adequate. The 
irreparable injury rule almost never bars specific relief, because substitutionary remedies are almost never 
adequate. At the stage of permanent relief, any litigant with a plausible need for specific relief can satisfy the 
irreparable injury rule.”). 
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injunctions for specific performance of a contract), these forms of judicial 
relief collectively still only make up a portion of the remedies awarded by 
courts and therefore do little to explain the numerous other remedies that 
courts frequently award. Restorative remedies, in short, are necessary but not 
sufficient to account for the numerous individual remedies awarded more 
broadly within the “law” of remedies. 
What may be said of these other nonrestorative remedies? Are they merely 
aberrations to more fundamental restorative remedies, relegated to a 
miscellaneous remedial category called “other things courts do when 
restoration is not an option”? Or, do these nonrestorative remedies speak to 
something more fundamental? 
To answer this, we must turn our attention to the other remedial interests, 
not only as methods of categorizing the various remedies, but also as a means 
of exploring the relationship between and among the various remedial 
interests. If we are to be satisfied with the four remedial interests as a way of 
not only categorizing but also justifying the various remedies courts award, we 
will have to do much better than merely point out that certain remedies tend to 
fall into certain remedial categories. 
B. The Retributive Interest 
Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the 
penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if 
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it 
is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an 
abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be.38 
 
– F.H. Bradley 
Juxtaposed to the substantive goal of restoration—which takes a backward-
looking, victim-centered approach to remedies and attempts to restore the 
victim to his or her rightful position—another principle by which the law of 
remedies might be organized is the principle of retribution, which would take a 
backward-looking, wrongdoer-centered approach and focus not on what 
should be given to the victim by way of restoration, but on what should be 
taken from the wrongdoer by way of retributive punishment. 
 
 38  F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 26–27 (2d ed. 1927). 
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Admittedly, it may seem strange to talk about retribution as a principle by 
which the law of remedies might be organized. As J. D. Mabbott once 
observed, retributivism seems to be “the only moral theory except perhaps 
psychological hedonism which has been definitely destroyed by criticism,”39 
and I suspect that many of us, when we think about retribution, instinctively 
conjure up an age in which uncivilized man, unable to control his bloodlust,40 
acted upon some vaguely articulated visceral need to mete out revenge41 
against those who had wronged him.42 Additionally, even assuming that 
retribution could be dressed up and made to look more respectable in polite 
company, the entire idea seems to lend itself to criminal law, rather than civil 
law, where it is frequently juxtaposed with another ubiquitous principle we 
shall soon be discussing—coercion.43 The mere thought of retribution as an 
organizing principle in private law, therefore, not only grates against the ears 
of many civil law scholars, but also seems to cut against the innumerable 
instances in which judges have gone out of their way to categorically reaffirm 
the shibboleth of restoration while denying the normative and descriptive 
significance of retribution.44 
 
 39  J. D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152 (1939). Over the past seventy years, however, this 
atavism of moral philosophy has made a bit of a comeback in no small part due to Mabbott’s article, but 
mostly in the public law realm. See, e.g., D J Galligan, The Return to Retribution in Penal Theory, in CRIME, 
PROOF AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 144, 144 (1981). Retributivism is still 
largely ignored in the realm of private law remedies, a defect I hope this Article will help remedy. 
 40  See HOLMES, supra note 31, at 40 (“It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never 
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.”). 
 41  See, e.g., id. at 45 (describing retribution as “vengeance in disguise”); KARL A. MENNINGER, THE 
HUMAN MIND 448 (3d ed. 1947) (“The reasons usually given to justify punishment do not explain why it 
exists. They serve only to conceal the truth, that the scheme of punishment is a barbarous system of revenge, 
by which society tries to ‘get even’ with the criminal.”); PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 45 (“To give as one’s 
reason for inflicting pain or deprivation on a man that he has done a certain thing is an all too familiar way of 
talking. This is the language of revenge.”). But see IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 214 (Louis Infield 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1981) (1930) (drawing a distinction between retributive punishment and revenge, 
insisting that the former requires a principle of equality between the crime and the punishment, whereas the 
latter is marked by an “insist[ence] on one’s right beyond what is necessary for its defence,” making such 
punishment “revengeful”). 
 42  See, e.g., PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 1 (“Legal punishment is viewed by some of the most sensitive 
and well-educated people of our time as a survival of barbarism, bereft of rational foundation, supported only 
by inertia and the wish to have vengeance on criminals.”). 
 43  See infra Part II.C. 
 44  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127–28 (7th ed. 2007). Standard economic 
analysis suggests that the goal of contract remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” See, e.g., E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 737 (4th ed. 2004). Because of this, promisors who breach for financial 
reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like punitive damages have no place in contract law 
because they will “encourage performance when breach would be socially more desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’ 
breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.  
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Yet, as this Article argues below, the notion of retribution nevertheless 
does play a significant role across a wide range of private and public law 
remedies, and the failure to recognize this concept renders incomprehensible a 
large swath of remedies issued daily by courts around the country. To be clear, 
my claim here is not that courts exercise (or even possess) unbridled discretion 
to vindictively punish parties to their gavel’s content. They do not. What I do 
mean to suggest, however, is that courts frequently exercise their discretion to 
implement a very circumscribed and principled type of punishment—
retributive punishment—on a much more regular basis than is commonly 
acknowledged. Therefore, before proceeding further, I want to pause and 
briefly sketch out precisely what I mean when I use the term retribution or 
retributive punishment throughout the remainder of this article. 
Although retribution is a particularly slippery concept, in no small part due 
to the fact that it has been defined in many different ways over the years,45 
“retribution” as used in this Article shall refer specifically to a theory of legal 
punishment requiring that (a) a wrongdoer should only be punished for 
breaching a legally recognized duty,46 (b) in proportion to the grievousness of 
his wrong.47 The first prong of this definition focuses on the justification for 
punishment and maintains that a wrongdoer may not be punished for the sole 
purpose of compensating a victim, deterring a future wrongdoer, or even 
 
 45  In a well-known article, John Cottingham offered at least nine separate versions of retributivist 
theories. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979). The nine theories of 
retributivism discussed were repayment theory, desert theory, penalty theory, minimalism, satisfaction theory, 
fair play theory, placation theory, annulment theory, and denunciation theory. Id. 
 46  “Juridical [p]unishment . . . must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is 
inflicted has committed a Crime.” KANT, supra note 15, at 195; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING 
BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88 (1997) (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral 
desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her . . . .”); Hugo Adam Bedau, Concessions to 
Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 51, 52 (J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 
1977) (“[A] retributivist holds that a punishment is just if and only if the offender deserves it.”). 
 47  “[T]he mode and measure of Punishment which Public Justice takes as its Principle . . . is just the 
Principle of Equality, by which the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to the one side 
than the other.” KANT, supra note 15, at 196; see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart 
of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the 
criminal offender.”); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989) (listing the principle that 
“[p]unishment ought to be proportionate to the offense” as one of the five fundamental tenets of 
retributivism); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 32 (Paul Edwards 
ed., 1967) (noting that retributivism “insists that the punishment must fit the crime”); Joel Feinberg, The 
Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 728 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000) (“The 
proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty offender is that amount which fits, 
matches, or is proportionate to the moral gravity of the offense.”); Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, 
Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347–48 (1983) (observing that for retributivism, “the 
severity of punishment should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing”).  
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protecting a future innocent victim. Rather, retributive punishment maintains 
that a wrongdoer should only be punished for violating a legally recognized 
duty that results in a wrongful harm to another party. The second prong of this 
definition focuses on the scope of punishment called for in an individual case 
and requires that the wrongdoer only be punished in proportion to the wrong 
committed. Getting the scope or quantum of the remedy just right requires 
thinking along the lines of Goldilocks: the judge must ensure both that the 
wrongdoer not be treated too leniently (e.g., by letting the wrongdoer “off the 
hook” by requiring him or her to pay a compensatory sum less than that 
required to compensate the victim for the harm suffered) or too harshly (e.g., 
by sacrificing the wrongdoer on the altar of social justice for the sake of 
deterring future wrongdoers from engaging in similar nefarious actions). By 
keeping this working definition of retributive punishment in mind, I hope to 
show, by way of example, that the principle of retribution is not only pervasive 
in our public criminal law, as one might expect, but can also be found roaming 
quite freely throughout the terrain of the private law, an idea that may well 
surprise those who focus more on what courts say than on what courts do. 
Like restorative remedies, retributive remedies may also take one of two 
forms: substitutionary and in-kind. I suspect that most of us, when we think 
about retributive remedies, think about the in-kind, eye-for-an-eye, talionic 
punishments sanctioned by such ancient legal texts as Hammurabi’s Code,48 
the Mosaic Law,49 and the Twelve Tables of Rome.50 Though Mahatma 
Ghandi undoubtedly had these in-kind remedies in mind when he famously 
 
 48  See, e.g., THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 25 (L.W. King trans., 2011) (c. 1750 B.C.E.), available at 
http://www.general-intelligence.com/library/hr.pdf (“If a man put out the eye of another man, his eye shall be 
put out. [An eye for an eye].” (alteration in original)); id. (“If he break another man’s bone, his bone shall be 
broken.”); id. (“If a man knock out the teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked out. [A tooth for a tooth].” 
(alteration in original)); id. at 27 (“If a builder build a house for some one, and does not construct it properly, 
and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death. If it kill the son of 
the owner the son of that builder shall be put to death. If it kill a slave of the owner, then he shall pay slave for 
slave to the owner of the house.”). 
 49  See, e.g., Exodus 21:23–25 (King James) (“And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for 
life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for 
stripe.”); Exodus 21:31 (King James) (“Whether he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, according to 
this judgment shall it be done unto him.”); Leviticus 24:19–20 (King James) (“And if a man cause a blemish in 
his neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he 
hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again.”); Deuteronomy 19:21 (King James) (“And 
thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”). 
 50  See, e.g., The Laws of the Twelve Tables, reprinted in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 57, 70 (S.P. Scott trans., AMS 
Press 1973) (c. 450 B.C.E.) (“When anyone breaks a member of another, and is unwilling to come to make a 
settlement with him, he shall be punished by the law of retaliation.”). 
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quipped that an eye for an eye “ends in making everybody blind,”51 this 
criticism fails to appreciate how well many in-kind retributive punishments 
actually work; a retributive remedy that required a thief to return a stolen pair 
of glasses to his victim would result in a remedy that made the world’s 
collective eyesight better, not worse.52 Further, this criticism ignores 
substitutionary retributive punishments, of which a large portion can be found 
prominently throughout the private law of contracts, torts, and unjust 
enrichment, not to mention the world of criminal law, where they reign 
virtually supreme. 
As mentioned earlier, the most obvious instance in which the principle of 
retribution animates our private law is the area of punitive damages.53 Here, 
courts recognize an interest in punishing wrongdoers who behave in a 
reprehensible manner by acting “in reckless disregard of the consequences” 
when the wrongdoer “likely knew or ought to have known . . . that his conduct 
would naturally or probably result in injury,”54 or by showing, for example, 
that the wrongdoer acted with a “‘willful and conscious disregard of the rights 
or safety of others,’”55 a “‘conscious disregard for . . . a great probability of 
causing substantial harm,’”56 “ill will” toward the victim, or behavior “so 
outrageous that malice toward a person injured as a result of that conduct can 
be implied.”57 
But the notion of retribution is much more pervasive than would be 
suggested by narrowly focusing on punitive damages. Consider, for instance, 
 
 51  THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 269 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).  
 52  For a wonderful defense of talionic punishment in general, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 
(2006). 
 53  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that 
punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] punitive damages award, 
instead of serving a compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence 
that underlie every criminal sanction.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) 
(“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” (alteration in original) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (taking into account “the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct,” among other factors, in determining an appropriate punishment); Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[S]ubstantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the 
case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.”). 
 54  Union Pac. R.R. v. Barber, 149 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Ark. 2004). 
 55  Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 76 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3294(c)(1) (West 2004)). 
 56  Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Ohio 1991) (quoting Preston v. Murty, 
512 N.E.2d 1174, 1174 (Ohio 1987)). 
 57  Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985). 
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the realm of contract law, where, perhaps more than in any other substantive 
area of the law, the role of punishment has long been thought to have no 
place58 for at least two separate reasons. First, because it is sometimes thought 
that the “duty to keep a contract” is merely “a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else,”59 it seems to follow that, so 
long as the victim’s interest in restoration is protected in the event of breach 
(e.g., through an award of compensatory damages), then the wrongdoer has 
fulfilled his or her contractual duty, and there remains no harm for which 
retributive punishment would be justified. Second, if we assume that the victim 
has been fully compensated in the event of a wrongdoer’s breach, then the 
principle of retribution would also have the deleterious effect of “deter[ring] 
efficient . . . breaches, by making the cost of the breach to the contract breaker 
greater than the cost of the breach to the victim.”60 
 
 58  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 4, intro. note (1981) (“‘Willful’ 
breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches . . . .”); HOLMES, supra note 31, at 236 (“The only 
universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the 
promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for 
fulfil[l]ment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal 
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) (“In its essential design . . . our 
system of remedies for breach of contract is one of strict liability and not of liability based on fault . . . .”). 
 59  Holmes, supra note 28, at 462; see also Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F. 
Supp. 2d 1047, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2000) (“[The] ‘bad man’ theory of contracts permeates American common law. 
That is, a contracting party usually cannot demand performance of a valid contract; rather, the defaulting party 
must either perform or pay damages equivalent to the value of the promised performance. Under this approach 
to contract theory, it follows that when performance becomes uneconomic, a contracting party will not 
infrequently break a contract, preferring instead to pay damages.”); Estate of Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437, 
440 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Fuzzy moral notions of right and 
wrong, good and bad are irrelevant. That persons not parties to the contract may suffer loss is of no concern of 
the law. . . . Persons potentially affected who have failed to act to protect their interests sit idle at their peril. 
The law is wholly indifferent to non-legal consequences. It would allow one to think and behave as the 
proverbial Holmesean bad man to his heart’s content.” (citing Holmes, supra note 28, at 459)); Clark A. 
Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the 
Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) (“The law has come to 
regard the obligation to perform a contract as being generally equivalent to an option to perform or pay 
damages. Holmes saw the matter this way more than one hundred years ago.”). The court in Norcia went on to 
find that when a bad man breaches a contract, the only punishment is to pay damages, and nothing else. 
Norcia, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (quoting Holmes, supra note 28, at 462); see also Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony 
Orchestra, 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass. 1985) (recognizing that “[t]he suggested freedom to break a 
contract and suffer liability only for the legally recognized damages is within the scope of the idea often 
referred to as Holmes’[s] bad man theory of contract law—that one who is willing to pay the penalty of such 
damages as the law assesses is free to break the contract and pay” (citing Holmes, supra note 28, at 461–62)), 
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 60  POSNER, supra note 44, at 127–28. Standard economic analysis suggests that the goal of contract 
remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.3, at 737. 
Because of this, promisors who breach for financial reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like 
punitive damages have no place in contract law because they will “encourage performance when breach would 
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Nevertheless, even in the law of contracts, the principle of retribution does 
play a prominent role and is often needed to make sense of numerous remedial 
decisions made by courts. Consider, for instance, the famous 1921 case of 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,61 in which the parties entered into a contract 
pursuant to which the plaintiff–builder, Jacob & Youngs, agreed to build a 
country residence for the defendant–homeowner, Kent.62 In their contract, 
Jacob & Youngs further promised to install only pipe manufactured by the 
Reading Pipe Company.63 The defendant completed the construction, but 
throughout much of the house unintentionally installed Cohoes pipe, which 
was of the same quality, appearance, market value, and cost as Reading pipe.64 
After Kent took possession of the residence, he discovered that some of the 
pipe did not conform to the contract, claimed that Jacob & Youngs failed to 
satisfy a condition in the contract, and refused to pay the balance due.65 
Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, found that although Jacob & Youngs 
breached the contract by failing to install the specific brand of pipe requested 
by the defendant, its mistake was both unintentional and harmless.66 Therefore, 
according to Cardozo, the real issue was whether, in such a situation, the court 
should imply a condition, the nonsatisfaction of which would result in a 
 
be socially more desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’ breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.; 
see also POSNER, supra note 44, at 94–142. 
 61 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
 62 Id. at 890. 
 63 Id. Specifically, the contract said that “[a]ll wrought-iron pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded 
pipe of the grade known as ‘standard pipe’ of Reading manufacture.” Id. Another provision in the contract 
specifically required that “[a]ny work furnished by the Contractor, the material or workmanship of which is 
defective or which is not fully in accordance with the drawings and specifications, in every respect, will be 
rejected and is to be immediately torn down, removed, and remade or replaced in accordance with the 
drawings and specifications, whenever discovered.” RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 
888 (4th ed. 2008). 
 64 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. As noted by Carol Chomsky: 
Some manufacturers used names for their pipe that makers of ‘genuine wrought iron pipe’ 
thought misleading. In order to avoid confusion, trade publications suggested specifying a 
particular manufacturer that was known to produce pipe of the quality desired so that only pipe of 
that standard would be used. The contract between Kent and Jacob & Youngs also contained 
language suggesting that the specification of Reading pipe was meant only to specify a standard, 
not to require absolutely that no other brand be used. 
Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the Measure of Damages for Construction 
Contracts, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1445, 1447 n.11 (1991) (citing RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN 
CONTRACT LAW 122 (1978)). 
 65  Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890.  
 66  Id. Further bolstering the builder’s claim was the fact that the Cohoes pipe that was installed was of the 
same quality, appearance, market value, and cost as Reading pipe. Id.  
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forfeiture, or whether the court should merely find that Jacob & Youngs 
breached the contract (but did not violate an implied condition), and hold it 
liable for compensatory damages. In a memorable passage, Cardozo wrote: 
The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure 
of his duty by less than full performance. They do say, however, that 
an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for 
by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the 
breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture. The distinction is 
akin to that between dependent and independent promises, or 
between promises and conditions.67 
Framed in such a manner, the issue that now confronted Judge Cardozo 
was whether the language in the contract constituted (a) a condition that had 
not been satisfied, in which case Jacob & Youngs would not be entitled to 
recover the balance due under the contract unless it replaced the 
nonconforming pipe with Reading pipe, or (b) a promise that had been 
breached, in which case Jacob & Youngs could recover the balance due under 
the contract, but would be liable to Kent for any damages he might have 
suffered due to the installation of nonconforming pipe. In making this 
determination, Cardozo set forth the following rubric for distinguishing 
conditions from promises: 
Some promises are so plainly independent that they can never by fair 
construction be conditions of one another. Others are so plainly 
dependent that they must always be conditions. Others, though 
dependent and thus conditions when there is departure in point of 
substance, will be viewed as independent and collateral when the 
departure is insignificant. Considerations partly of justice and partly 
of presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that promise 
shall be placed in one class or in another.68 
Here, because Cardozo found that considerations of justice (the departure 
was insignificant in point of substance, the defect was insignificant in its 
relation to the project, and the cost of replacing the nonconforming pipe was 
great) and presumable intention (the breach was unintentional rather than 
willful) favored Jacob & Youngs, Cardozo held that the language used in the 
contract requesting Reading pipe was a promise, rather than a condition, and 
that Jacob & Youngs was entitled to payment of the balance due under the 
 
 67  Id. (citations omitted). 
 68  Id. (citations omitted). 
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contract.69 Because Jacob & Youngs breached, however, they were still liable 
to Kent for money damages. In determining the measure of those damages, 
Cardozo wrote: 
[T]he measure of the allowance is not the cost of replacement, which 
would be great, but the difference in value, which would be either 
nominal or nothing. . . . The owner is entitled to the money which 
will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly 
and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained.70 
Here, because the breach was insignificant, and because the difference 
between these two measures of damages was disproportional, Kent could only 
recover diminution in value damages (i.e., the difference in value between the 
house with Reading pipe and the house with Cohoes pipe) rather than the more 
generous cost of completion damages (i.e., the amount it would cost Kent to 
tear out the nonconforming Cohoes pipe and replace it with Reading pipe).71 
Because Cohoes and Reading pipe were of the same quality, appearance, 
value, and cost, the expectation damages awarded by the court “would be 
either nominal or nothing.”72 
This case, and others like it,73 is commonly understood by many 
commentators as presenting a choice between two different measures of 
expectation damages—cost of completion versus diminution in value—both of 
which are restorative (quadrant I) in that they attempt to measure the injured 
party’s loss by restoring that party to the position he or she would have 
occupied but for the breach.74 Viewed in this manner, the case seems to read 
like other contracts cases in which the court is confronted with a policy choice 
between two different measures of a restorative remedy, both of which are 
 
 69  See id. at 891. 
 70  Id.  
 71  See id. 
 72  Id.  
 73  See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 238 (Minn. 1939); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal 
& Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962); Eastlake Constr. Co. v. Hess, 686 P.2d 465, 470 (Wash. 1984) 
(en banc).  
 74  See, e.g., Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1073, 1095 n.71 (1988) (describing Jacob & Youngs, Inc., Groves, and Peevyhouse as cases in which 
“the issue is not whether to award damages sufficient to put the victim of the breach in the same position as if 
the contract had been performed,” for this is a given, but rather determining “how to measure or define that 
position”); Chomsky, supra note 64, at 1450–51 (“When choosing a remedy, a court aims primarily to 
compensate the injured party adequately—to place her in as good a position as if the contract had been 
performed—while avoiding overcompensation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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completely within the purview of quadrant I.75 Faced with this decision—
again, still viewing the problem through the lens of restoration—it does not 
seem unreasonable to make this policy choice on economic (or other) grounds. 
Thus, according to some commentators, where the “[l]oss in value to the 
owner is likely to be only a small fraction of the cost to complete,” then 
“diminution in market price [is] probably the better approximation of this 
loss.”76 Not only is it frequently thought that a cost of completion remedy 
might lead, in some cases, to “economic waste,”77 but even where it does not, 
such a remedy may be criticized as “result[ing] in a ‘windfall’ to the injured 
party.”78 
On the other hand, many of these same commentators also recognize that 
where diminution in value damages do not fully reflect the loss suffered by the 
promisee, it will result in undercompensation.79 Like the notion of “windfall” 
discussed above, this too is unacceptable if the goal is restoration. Quadrant I’s 
lens of restoration, then, seems to provide no clear answers to distinguish 
between cost of completion and diminution in value cases, and has even led 
some commentators to suggest that we might resolve the issue by splitting the 
remedial baby: 
Rather than accept the draconian choice between overcompensation 
through cost [of completion] and undercompensation through 
diminution in market price, the trier of the facts ought to be allowed 
at least to fix an intermediate amount as its best estimate, in the light 
of all the circumstances, of the loss in value to the injured party.80 
This approach, however, seems to be without a principled justification, as it 
seems to advocate awarding a remedy in between two principled amounts for 
the sake of awarding a remedy, rather than forcing courts to grapple with the 
underlying justification for the remedy itself. Unlike King Solomon, whose 
order to split the baby achieved justice precisely because it was not carried 
 
 75  See supra note 73.  
 76  FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.13, at 789–90 (second emphasis added). 
 77  See, e.g., Cnty. of Maricopa v. Walsh & Oberg Architects, Inc., 494 P.2d 44, 47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) 
(“The conceptual defense of economic waste has been recognized in Arizona.”). 
 78  FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.13, at 790. 
 79  See, e.g., id. (“On the other hand, the less generous measure may deprive the injured party of 
compensation for some of the loss in value if that loss is not fully reflected in the diminution in market 
price.”). 
 80  Id. 
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out,81 a “splitting the baby” remedy, if carried out (either by King Solomon, 
then, or by a judge, today), would seem to result in injustice because it would 
give to one party only half as much as that party deserved while leaving the 
wrongdoing party with a half share too much. Might there be a better solution 
to this problem? 
This Article suggests that the answer is yes: the seemingly intractable 
problem presented by Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent and other similar cases 
seems to be an illusion created by viewing the problem exclusively through the 
restorative lens itself, which becomes obfuscated when presented with legal 
problems that cannot clearly be discerned through the lens by which it is 
viewed. By changing our remedial lens, however, and viewing these problems 
through other remedial lenses (e.g., the quadrant II lens of retribution), these 
seemingly thorny remedial questions become both clearer and more interesting 
as well. 
So how might our analysis of the remedial problem set forth in Jacob & 
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent be affected by viewing the matter through a different 
remedial lens—say, the retributive lens? First of all, such an approach would 
invite the judge to consider, for instance, the fact that a cost of completion 
remedy, rather than overcompensating the victim, may be just what was 
necessary to take ill-gotten gains from a wrongdoing party; or that a 
diminution in value remedy, rather than undercompensating a victim, may be 
one way for a court to ensure that no more is taken from a relatively innocent 
wrongdoing party than what is absolutely necessary. So, for example, by 
taking the retributive interest seriously, we could look at a case like Jacob & 
Youngs with fresh eyes, and would reexamine Cardozo’s rhetoric concerning 
the cause of the default, the willfulness of the breach, and the builder’s 
insistence to exercise its own discretion by installing pipe it perceived to be 
“‘just as good’”82 not as the obscure and peripheral musings of an all-too-
 
 81  See 1 Kings 3:16–28 (New American Bible). The story of King Solomon proceeds as follows: Two 
prostitutes came before King Solomon for a judgment, each claiming to be the mother of a baby. King 
Solomon requested a sword, and gave the order to “[c]ut the living child in two, and give half to one woman 
and half to the other.” One woman was mortified, and pleaded with Solomon: “Please, my lord, give her the 
living child—please do not kill it!” The other woman, however, said, “It shall be neither mine nor yours. 
Divide it!” King Solomon then rendered his verdict, saying, “Give the first one the living child! By no means 
kill it, for she is the mother.” We are told that “[w]hen all Israel heard the judgment the king had given, they 
were in awe of him, because they saw that the king had in him the wisdom of God for giving judgment.” Id. 
 82  Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (quoting Easthampton Lumber & Coal 
Co. v. Worthington, 79 N.E. 323, 324 (N.Y. 1906)). 
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clever judge (as it often seems to my students when viewed through the 
restorative lens of compensation). 
Instead, when viewed through the retributive lens, such rhetoric becomes 
central to unlocking the case’s meaning. Words that otherwise seemed strange 
and aberrational in the context of contract law,83 such as Cardozo’s refusal to 
visit this particular builder’s “venial faults with oppressive retribution” while 
admonishing others that “[t]he willful transgressor must accept the penalty of 
his transgression,”84 are given new meaning and hold a potentially powerful 
sway over private law. By recasting Jacob & Youngs as a case not only (or 
even primarily) about restoration, but also about retribution, it reveals that 
punishing the breaching party by taking from the wrongdoer what the 
wrongdoer himself took from the injured party (i.e., Reading pipe, measured 
by the cost of completion remedy) is not warranted where the breach was both 
unintentional and trivial. 
If this is correct, and courts take seriously the notion of retributive relief in 
private law, then there should be instances in which courts, when faced with a 
choice between two different restorative remedies, decide the issue on 
retributive grounds by punishing more severely defendants who intentionally 
breached their contracts, or otherwise behaved badly, by taking from the 
wrongdoing parties what they themselves have taken from their victim, either 
in-kind or substitutionarily, by way of a dollar equivalent. A perfect test case, 
it would seem, would be one in which a judge would seem to be guided by 
retributive concerns and where an intentional breach is both trivial and 
incidental to the main purpose of the contract, and even more conclusive still 
would be a case in which the cost of completion damages are grossly 
disproportional to the diminution in value damages. The law, it turns out, is 
replete with such cases.85 
 
 83  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.3, at 737. Farnsworth noted that standard economic analysis 
suggests that the goal of contract remedies is “compensation and not compulsion.” Id. Because of this, 
promisors who breach for financial reasons “should not be dealt with harshly,” concepts like punitive damages 
have no place in contract law because they will “encourage performance when breach would be socially more 
desirable,” and “‘[w]illful’ breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.” Id.; see also POSNER, 
supra note 44, at 93–142. 
 84  Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 891. 
 85  In addition to numerous material breach cases with fact patterns similar to Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. 
Kent, Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment would go even further 
toward punishing intentional breaches by forcing promisors to disgorge any profits from their opportunistic 
breaches. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRIDCHMENT § 39, at 646 (2011) (“If a 
deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor and the available damage remedy 
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Consider, for instance, Groves v. John Wunder Co.86 In this case, the 
plaintiff owned a tract of land on which there were deposits of sand and gravel 
and a plant for excavating and screening the gravel.87 The defendant leased the 
land from the plaintiff for $105,000 to remove the sand and gravel and 
promised to leave the property at a uniform grade.88 After removing the richest 
gravel, the defendant deliberately breached the contract by refusing to restore 
the land to a uniform grade at a cost $60,000, when it realized that the value of 
the land if restored would only be $12,160.89 Not surprisingly, the defendant 
argued along the lines of the principle established in Jacob & Youngs that a 
cost of completion remedy should not be awarded where it was 
disproportionate to a diminution in value award.90 
Here, once again, the court was ostensibly confronted with a choice 
between two different measures of restoration. However, unlike the builder in 
Jacob & Youngs, which Cardozo found to have acted unintentionally, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota found the defendant’s breach in Groves to be 
“wil[l]ful,” and therefore opted to restore the plaintiff to its rightful position 
through the more generous cost of completion damages.91 
If we try to explain such cases on restorative grounds, the problem, as 
previously suggested, becomes intractable: we can either pretend that both cost 
of completion and diminution in value damages are equally (and fully) 
compensatory and ignore the (usually obvious) differences between them, or 
we can recognize that the courts in such cases are being confronted with a 
difficult choice between overcompensation and undercompensation92 without 
 
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution 
of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach.”). 
 86  286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939). 
 87  Id. at 235. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 236. 
 90  Id. at 242 (Olson, J., dissenting).  
 91  Id. at 236 (majority opinion). 
 92  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 121 (“It is true that not enforcing the contract would have given 
the defendant a windfall. But enforcing the contract gave the plaintiff an equal and opposite windfall . . . .”); 
see also Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1962) (“The question [regarding 
the collateral source rule] is not whether a windfall is to be conferred, but rather who shall receive the benefit 
of a windfall which already exists. As between the injured person and the tortfeasor, the former’s claim is the 
better. This may permit a double recovery, but it does not impose a double burden. The tortfeasor bears only 
the single burden for his wrong. That burden is imposed by society, not only to make the plaintiff whole, but 
also to deter negligence and encourage due care. . . . Collateral source funds are . . . . intended for the benefit 
of the injured person, and not for that of the person who injures him. That intention should be effectuated.”). In 
Gypsum Carrier, we see clearly the court’s concern with the retributive interest, both in terms of making sure 
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any (restorative) way of choosing between the two different measures. We can 
also, I suppose, try to attribute the court’s decision to remedial discretion; this 
is probably what is intended when this case is discussed by authors alongside 
the likes of Jacob & Youngs and distinguished by a “cf.” signal. This, too, 
seems unsatisfactory, and reminds one of the unprincipled “split the baby” 
approach discussed above.93 
However, if we allow for the possibility that the retributive interest is 
playing a role here, and take seriously the suggestion that courts are moved by 
the fact that the defendant’s breach ought to be punished more severely when it 
is willful and in bad faith,94 then this case, and others like it,95 suddenly fall 
into place. 
Furthermore, these cases cut sharply against the so-called Holmesian view 
of contracts,96 which holds that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law 
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and 
nothing else.”97 The law, it turns out, suggests something quite different: 
 
that, as between an innocent and wrongdoing party, the wrongdoer pays for his wrong (“[c]ollateral source 
funds are . . . . intended for the benefit of the injured person, and not for that of the person who injures him”), 
and in terms of ensuring that the wrongdoer does not pay either too much or too little for his wrong (“[t]he 
tortfeasor bears only the single burden for his wrong”). Id. Remarkably, the court seemed to be confronted 
with a choice of selecting between a restorative or retributive remedy, and came down on the side of the latter 
(“[a]s between the injured person and the tortfeasor, the former’s claim is the better”), even where this leads to 
over-protection of the restorative interest (i.e., a “windfall”). Id. The case is also interesting in that it also 
touches on the relationship between the restorative and retributive interests to the coercive interest (“[t]hat 
burden is imposed by society, not only to make the plaintiff whole, but also to deter negligence and encourage 
due care”), id., an idea that will be further pursued in Part III. 
 93  See supra text accompanying note 81. 
 94  See, e.g., Groves, 286 N.W. at 236; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 39, at 646 (2011). 
 95  See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263, 265 (1946) (awarding 
compensatory damages that were “speculative and uncertain” because “the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the 
uncertainty which his own wrong has created”); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948) 
(paying homage to the traditional rule that “[a] party may have specific performance of a contract for the sale 
of chattels if the legal remedy is inadequate,” but noting that there is “no reason why a court should be 
reluctant to grant specific relief when it can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming 
processes against one who has deliberately broken his agreement,” and denying specific performance on other 
grounds (emphasis added)). 
 96  There is some debate as to whether this was actually Holmes’s view or not. As I have argued 
elsewhere, Holmes should probably be understood as making a descriptive point, rather than a normative one, 
and was merely describing what contract law looks like when viewed through the bad man’s eyes. See Marco 
Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2011). 
 97  Holmes, supra note 28, at 462; see also HOLMES, supra note 31, at 300–01 (“It is true that in some 
instances equity does what is called compelling specific performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional 
one. The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay 
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although the breach of a legal duty will almost always invoke society’s interest 
in restoring a victim to its rightful position, society’s interest in retribution 
(varying in proportion to the wrongfulness of the wrongdoer’s breach) will 
sometimes outweigh society’s interest in restoration, even in a field as 
seemingly divorced from punishment as contract law.98 
Outside of contract law, of course, the case for retributive punishment is 
even easier to establish.99 In the law of unjust enrichment, for example, courts 
 
damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until 
the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”). 
 98  George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1994) (“The 
fundamental premise of most theories of contract damages has been that contract damage law is a ‘strict 
liability’ system; that is, the reason the breach occurs does not matter in determining the measure of damages. 
That premise is wrong. In fact, the reason the breach occurs has always influenced courts’ determination of the 
proper measure of damages.” (footnote omitted)). But if punishment is sometimes appropriate in contract law, 
how is one to explain the reluctance of courts to award punitive damages for ordinary contract breaches? In 
fact, is not the purpose of punitive damages to punish and deter wrongdoers, rather than compensate victims, 
whereas the stated purpose of contract damages is the exact opposite: to compensate the injured party, but not 
to punish or deter?  
  Even here, where it is hard to imagine the remedial “rules” being any clearer, things are not what they 
seem. Where a wrongdoer’s conduct is particularly egregious, courts will often find ways to punish the 
wrongdoing party, either by “adjusting” the amount of “compensation” due, as discussed above, or by 
“breaking the rules” of contract damages and awarding punitive damages where the breaches are particularly 
egregious. See, e.g., Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 61 P.3d 557, 568 (Idaho 2002) (“[I]n breach of 
contract cases . . . punitive damages might be appropriate if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently 
egregious.”); Brown v. Fritz, 699 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Idaho 1985) (“[W]hen damages are sought for breach of a 
contractual relationship, there can be no recovery for emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff. If the conduct 
of a defendant has been sufficiently outrageous, we view the proper remedy to be in the realm of punitive 
damages.”); Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 880 P.2d 300, 307 (N.M. 1994) (“[A]n award of punitive 
damages in a breach-of-contract case must be predicated on a showing of bad faith, or at least a showing that 
the breaching party acted with reckless disregard for the interests of the nonbreaching party.”).  
  While a mere breach of conduct will not imply a basis for punitive damages, “[a] mental state 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages will exist when the defendant acts with ‘reckless disregard’ 
for the rights of the plaintiff—i.e., when the defendant knows of potential harm to the interests of the plaintiff 
but nonetheless ‘utterly fail[s] to exercise care’ to avoid the harm.” Id. at 308 (alteration in original). The court 
in Paiz went on to emphasize that while the general rule is that breach-of-contract damages are limited to 
compensatory damages, courts have employed “a narrow exception . . . by penalizing conduct that constitutes 
a ‘wanton disregard’ for the nonbreaching party’s rights, or ‘bad faith,’ with an award of punitive damages.” 
Id. at 309. A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will be found if “one party 
wrongfully and intentionally used the contract to the detriment of the other party” where the breaching party 
“is consciously aware of, and proceeds with deliberate disregard for, the potential of harm to the other party.” 
Id. at 309–10. Although the court ultimately found that punitive damages were not proper in this case because 
there was a finding of only negligence, there is a wonderful discussion of when punitive damages for breach of 
contract would be appropriate. See id. at 307; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 1997 SD 121, 
573 N.W.2d 493. 
 99  See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (noting that Section 
4 of the Clayton Act is a “remedial provision” that, by allowing treble damages, plays “an important role in 
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing”). 
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frequently take into account the culpability of the wrongdoer in awarding an 
appropriate remedy, and it is hard to deny (though courts and commentators 
sometimes do so)100 that the notion of punishment is playing a significant 
role.101 Consider, for instance, the case of Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,102 in 
which the plaintiff sold his interest in an egg-packing business to the 
defendant, but retained ownership of an egg-washing machine that was 
formerly used by the business, which the plaintiff stored in a space adjacent to 
the defendant’s premises.103 Unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant began 
using the plaintiff’s egg-washing machine to cut down on the cost of labor.104 
When the plaintiff learned of this fact several years later, he offered to sell the 
machine to the defendant, but the parties could not agree on a price.105 The 
plaintiff then brought an action in unjust enrichment to recover “the reasonable 
value of [the] defendant’s use of the machine.”106 
Although the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s remedy should be limited 
to replevin or the rental value of the machine107 (both of which would fall into 
 
In his empirical examination of cases involving the granting or denial of injunctions involving 
violations of building restrictions, Professor Van Hecke found that the fact “[m]ost frequently and significantly 
relied upon as an affirmative basis for injunction was the defendant’s willfulness. The cases abound with such 
appraisals as deliberate, defiant, flagrant, intentional, premeditated, and at his peril.” M. T. Van Hecke, 
Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 TEX. L. REV. 
521, 530 (1954). 
 100  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, at 203 (2011) (“The 
object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the 
imposition of a penalty.”). 
 101  See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. d at 8 (“Restitution may strip a wrongdoer of all profits gained in a 
transaction . . . but principles of unjust enrichment will not support the imposition of a liability that leaves an 
innocent recipient worse off . . . .”). However, where the transferee is guilty of fault, the tables turn quickly. 
See, e.g., id. § 49, reporter’s note a at 184 (noting where the plaintiff has lost more than the wrongdoer has 
gained, “the measure of restitution is determined with reference to the tortiousness of the defendant’s conduct 
or the negligence or other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation giving rise to the right to 
restitution”). In addition:  
If the defendant was tortious in his acquisition of the benefit he is required to pay for what the 
other has lost although that is more than the recipient benefited. If he was consciously tortious in 
acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of any profit derived from his subsequent dealing with 
it. 
Id.; see also id. § 51, at 203 (“[T]he unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer . . . is the net profit 
attributable to the underlying wrong . . . .”); id. (“The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit 
from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.”). 
 102  173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 652–53. 
 105  Id. at 653. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id.  
JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:38 AM 
1338 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1309 
the restorative remedies of quadrant I), the trial court sided with the plaintiff, 
and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The court held: 
Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking 
from the defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to which 
the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not done, causing the defendant to 
pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore the plaintiff to the 
position in which he was before the defendant received the benefit.108 
If the value of the gain to the defendant was always equal to the loss to the 
plaintiff, the court reasoned, there would be no substantial problem as to the 
amount of recovery, since actions seeking restitution would be equivalent to 
actions seeking money damages.109 However, in cases such as this one, where 
the amount of gain realized by the defendant is not identical to the loss 
sustained by the plaintiff, “the measure of restitution is determined with 
reference to the tortiousness of the defendant’s conduct or the negligence or 
other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation giving rise to 
the right to restitution.”110 Here, because the defendant was tortious in its 
acquisition of the benefit of the egg-washing machine, the court required the 
defendant to disgorge this benefit, even though the amount of the defendant’s 
gain far exceeded the plaintiff’s loss.111 
Another illuminating example is provided by the twin cases of Edwards v. 
Lee’s Administrator112 and Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,113 which, like 
Jacob & Youngs and Groves, are remarkably similar in regard to all relevant 
facts save one: the culpability of the wrongdoing party. In Edwards, the “Great 
Onyx Cave” lay beneath the land of two separate landowners, Edwards and 
 
 108  Id. at 654 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch. 
8, topic 2, intro. note at 595–96 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch. 8, topic 
2, intro. note at 596 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111  Id. (“If he was consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of any profit derived 
from his subsequent dealing with it.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI 
CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note at 596 (1937)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Interestingly, toward the end of the opinion, the court attempted to justify its remedy by speaking in 
terms of awarding “the measure of restoration” needed to make the plaintiff whole, although it is clear 
throughout the opinion that the court was attempting no such thing: rather than restoring the plaintiff to his 
rightful position via an award of compensatory damages (a quadrant I remedy), the court was clearly focused 
on removing the wrongdoing party from the position it wrongfully occupied by forcing it to disgorge its gains 
to the plaintiff (a quadrant II remedy). Id. 
 112  96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936). 
 113  170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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Lee.114 Edwards discovered an entry to the cave on his land and began to 
“embark upon a program of advertising and exploitation for the purpose of 
bringing visitors to his cave.”115 Specifically, Edwards built a hotel near the 
mouth of the cave, improved and widened the footpaths and avenues in the 
cave, and led tours through the cave, making enough money “not only to cover 
the cost of operation, but also to yield a substantial revenue in addition 
thereto.”116 The visitors, however, were led not only through the portion of the 
cave beneath Edward’s land, but through the portion of the cave beneath Lee’s 
land as well, which could only be accessed through Edward’s entrance.117 
When Lee learned of this fact, he brought suit for trespass and sought damages, 
an injunction preventing further trespasses, and an accounting for profits 
resulting from operation of the cave.118 Although the cave under Lee’s land 
was not damaged in any way, and although it could be accessed only via 
Edward’s entrance, the court nevertheless forced Edwards to disgorge to Lee a 
pro-rata portion of his net profits, in large part because Edwards knew of the 
trespass to Lee’s land, and, the court reasoned, the law should not allow such a 
wrongdoer to profit from his own wrong.119 
The trespass issue was nearly identical in Beck, but the defendant’s 
culpability, and therefore the remedy that was awarded, was quite different. In 
Beck, Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) obtained storage rights to the 
Viola formation underlying 23,000 acres of property.120 After Northern began 
storing gas, “some of the gas vertically migrated from the Viola to the Simpson 
formation, a smaller formation directly beneath the Viola.”121 Once Northern 
learned of this fact, it thoroughly evaluated the Simpson formation, and 
obtained lease agreements from two-thirds of the affected landowners, 
exercising its eminent domain power against the others, including the 
plaintiffs.122 As in Edwards, the plaintiffs brought an action for “trespass and 
unjust enrichment related to the migration of gas to the Simpson formation”123 
and sought a pro-rata portion of the profits Northern gained as a result of 
 
 114  96 S.W.2d at 1029. 
 115  Id. at 1028. 
 116  Id. at 1029. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 1030, 1032–33 (“[A] wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his own wrong.”). 
 120  Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
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storing gas in the Simpson formation.124 The court, however, refused to award 
such a remedy, holding that “[t]he benefit that Northern received from the 
landowners was the use of the Simpson formation without payment of rent, for 
which the proper measure of damages was, as the district court found, fair 
rental value.”125 The court attempted to distinguish this case from others 
awarding disgorgement to the plaintiff on the ground that, but for the 
defendant’s actions in making use of the land, profits would not have gone to 
the original landowners.126 
This reasoning, of course, cannot explain what is really driving the court’s 
decision, in that it ignores the fact that the plaintiffs in both Olwell and 
Edwards also would not have gained any profits but for the actions of the 
defendant. A better explanation seems to be that the culpability of the 
defendants in Olwell and Edwards was much higher than the culpability of the 
defendant in Beck, and the court was adjusting its remedy to punish more 
severely the more culpable defendants, which is the principle at the heart of 
retributive punishment.127 Making such allowances to account for the 
culpability of the wrongdoing party, cases like those discussed above soon fall 
in line. 
Indeed, the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
takes one step forward in this direction by allowing courts to directly take into 
account the wrongdoer’s culpability in determining the remedy to be awarded, 
although it too strangely denies that what it is doing is punishing the culpable 
party128—rejecting the explanation that seems to best explain the remedy. My 
sense is that the defendants in such cases, and probably most individuals 
without legal training, would see the matter quite differently and view a 
remedy tied to the culpability of a defendant’s conduct in terms of retributive 
punishment. 
 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 1024. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Compare Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030, 1032 (Ky. 1936) (describing the defendants 
as willful trespassers and wrongdoers), and Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 653 (Wash. 1946) 
(describing the defendant as acting without the plaintiff’s knowledge and benefiting “by his wrong”), with 
Beck, 170 F.3d at 1021, 1024 (describing the defendant’s actions to prevent a problem and acknowledging a 
limited scope of wrongdoing). 
 128  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, at 203 (2011) (“The 
object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the 
imposition of a penalty.”). 
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C. The Coercive Interest 
The business of government is to promote the happiness of the 
society, by punishing and rewarding. . . . In proportion as an act tends 
to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is 
pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment.129 
 
– Jeremy Bentham 
In contrast to the two remedial interests discussed above, both of which 
took a backward-looking approach to remedies (from either a victim- or 
wrongdoer-centered perspective), another principle by which the law of 
remedies might be organized is the coercive interest (quadrant III).130 This 
interest, made popular by utilitarians and, more recently, law and economics 
scholars, takes a forward-looking, wrongdoer-centered approach to remedies 
and focuses neither on what should be given to the victim by way of 
restoration, nor on what should be taken from the wrongdoer by way of 
retribution,131 at least not directly.132 
Instead, the coercive approach advocates that remedies be chosen according 
to whether they (a) effectively encourage efficient or socially productive 
activity, on the one hand (i.e., positive coercion), or (b) deter inefficient or 
socially unproductive conduct (i.e., labeling those who commit such acts as 
wrongdoers), on the other (i.e., negative coercion).133 Thus, in sharp contrast to 
 
 129  BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 70. 
 130  I use the term coercion rather than deterrence because, from an economic standpoint, the law is 
concerned not only with deterring inefficient activities, but also in encouraging efficient activities as well. See 
POSNER, supra note 44, at 25 (“[T]he common law is best . . . explained as a system for maximizing the wealth 
of society.”).  
 131  See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 32, at 226 (arguing that, in its pure form, “economic analysis suggests 
that reprehensibility is irrelevant, and that underdeterrence is all that matters”). 
 132  BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 317. Whether punishment deters or not  
depends altogether upon the expectation it raises of similar punishment, in future cases of similar 
delinquency. But this future punishment . . . must always depend upon detection. If then the want 
of detection is such as must in general . . . appear too improbable to be reckoned upon, the 
punishment, though it should be inflicted, may come to be of no use. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 133  JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 113, 281 (Wilfrid 
Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1948) (1789) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation] (noting the purpose of punishment is “to augment the total happiness of the 
community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract 
from happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief”). According to Bentham, punishment was just one way of 
“exclud[ing] mischief,” and other ways include preventing mischief, suppressing mischief by “disablement,” 
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both the restorative134 and retributivist135 theories discussed above, the 
coercive interest holds that the only “principle [that] justifies the infliction of 
punishment” is the prevention of a legal wrong136 and the quantum of 
punishment inflicted on the defendant should be also directed at the prevention 
of a legal wrong, neither more nor less,137 “whether [this quantum] be 
proportionable to the guilt of the [wrongdoer] or not.”138 
 
and giving satisfaction for mischief already committed by “affording a pleasure or satisfaction to the party 
injured.” Id. at 281 n.1 (emphasis omitted). Bentham’s concern in preventing mischief roughly corresponds 
with what I have called the protection interest, and his concern with giving satisfaction for mischief committed 
roughly corresponds with what I have called the restorative interest. Bentham’s concern with punishment, 
however, is an essentially utilitarian one (its purpose is “to control action . . . . by its influence over [others’] 
wills; in which case it is said to operate in the way of example”), and he does not seem to make room for a 
utilitarian remedy outside the scope of punishment. Id. Further, Bentham’s theory distinguishes between two 
types of punishment that are designed to achieve the broader goal of deterrence: “[p]articular prevention,” 
which attempts to deter this particular wrongdoer by incapacitation, reformation, or intimidation, and “general 
prevention,” which tends to make an example of this particular wrongdoer to deter others in society from 
committing similar wrongful acts. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 396 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1843) [hereinafter 
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law]. I find Bentham’s terms particularly confusing, however, for they conflate 
the notions of punishment, deterrence, and protection, which I have tried hard to separate in this Article. For 
example, incapacitation is not inconsistent with Kant’s retributivist theory of punishment, without regard to 
whether it has the wholesome utilitarian effect of deterrence; reformation can be achieved without recourse to 
anything we would understand as punishment today (though punishment itself can certainly be one effective 
method of reformation); and intimidation, if successful, can hardly be called punishment, for there need not 
have been any wrongful act capable of punishment. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 178 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION] (noting that punishment should be administered “to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth 
while, all sorts of offences whatsoever”); PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 86 (“The purpose of legal 
punishment . . . for Bentham, [is] the prevention of crime.”). 
 134  The restorative view only allowed compensation to those suffering legal wrongs, and only in the 
amount necessary to put them in the position they would have occupied but for the wrong. See supra Part II.A. 
 135  The retributive view required that punishment only be administered to a wrongdoer who has 
committed a legal wrong, and only in proportion to the wrong he has inflicted on his victim. See supra Part 
II.B. 
 136  PALEY, supra note 17, at 384; see also PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 29 (“[T]raditional utilitarians hold 
that punishment can be justified only by reference to prevention of crime.”). 
 137  See, e.g., BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 133, at 182 (“The 
punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here 
given.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 138  PALEY, supra note 17, at 384. Thus, as with retributivism, the utilitarian’s answer to the question of 
how much we should punish is logically derived from his answer to the question of why we should punish in 
the first place, but it is important to point out that the two ideas do not stand or fall together; a rejection of the 
utilitarian principle of deterrence as a method for determining the quantum of punishment would not 
undermine the claim that the justification for punishing a wrongdoer is to prevent wrongdoing. 
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Along with retribution, the coercive interest (particularly in its negative 
form emphasizing deterrence) has long influenced the field of criminal law,139 
but has recently gained attention as a principle capable of organizing private 
law remedies,140 mostly through the work of law and economics scholars.141 
According to these scholars, remedies should be designed to achieve optimal 
levels of deterrence by preventing inefficient breaches of legal duties.142 So, 
for example, in the eyes of a law and economics scholar, “[t]he basic aim of 
contract law . . . [should be] to deter people from behaving opportunistically 
toward their contracting parties,”143 the basic aim of tort law should be “the 
optimal reduction of accident costs,”144 and the basic aim of criminal law 
should be “to prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, 
compensated exchange” so as “to promote economic efficiency.”145 This can 
be done by setting the “remedy” equal to the amount of harm caused by the 
wrongdoer, multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection, which 
would ensure that all nondetected wrongdoers would also be optimally 
deterred.146 
 
 139  Id. at 383 (“The proper end of human punishment is, not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention 
of crimes.”); see supra Part II.B.  
 140  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 23 (noting that only “since about 1960” has modern law and 
economics attempted to make sense of “the legal system across the board: to common law fields such as torts, 
contracts, restitution, and property; to statutory fields such as environmental regulation and intellectual 
property; to the theory and practice of punishment; to civil, criminal, and administrative procedure; to the 
theory of legislation and regulation; to law enforcement and judicial administration; and even to constitutional 
law, primitive law, admiralty law, family law, and jurisprudence”). 
 141  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44. 
 142  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 512. More formally, “optimal deterrence occurs at the point 
where the marginal social cost of reducing crime further equals the marginal social benefit.” Id. 
 143  POSNER, supra note 44, at 94 (footnote omitted). 
 144  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 14 (2001); see also id. (“[E]conomic analysis explicates negligence in terms of the Learned Hand 
formula. . . . Negligence is the imposition of unreasonable risks, and the criteria for the proper application of 
the concept of a reasonable risk are given by the Learned Hand test. The Learned Hand test is itself simply an 
expression of the economic goal of tort law, namely, the optimal reduction of accident costs.”); Patrick J. 
Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 743 
(2001) (“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the 
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and 
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.” (quoting Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 
611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev’d, 312 U.S. 492 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 145  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985). 
 146  Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 396–97. This is because “deterrence,” as it is usually 
understood, refers to both the specific deterrence of the wrongdoer, and the general deterrence of other 
potential wrongdoers who are able to act with the benefit of the defendant’s example. See, e.g., JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2–3 (1990). 
JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:38 AM 
1344 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1309 
Before looking at the relationship between the coercive interest and the 
other two remedial interests we have discussed, it is worth pausing to examine 
some of the areas in which the coercive interest has played a prominent role in 
structuring our law of remedies. One area in which the coercive interest is 
frequently acknowledged as a guiding remedial principle in private law is in 
the realm of punitive damages.147 In case after case, courts have emphasized 
the twin objectives of punitive damages awards: to punish the wrongdoing 
party (a quadrant II activity) and deter potential future wrongdoers from 
engaging in similar prohibited conduct (a quadrant III activity).148 
Although the scope of this remedy has been reigned in in recent years,149 
thereby constraining a court’s ability to achieve optimal deterrence,150 its 
presence in our law is an important reminder that sometimes a remedy has as 
its primary purpose neither restoration (quadrant I) nor retribution (quadrant 
II), but coercion (quadrant III), usually in the form of deterring others from 
engaging in socially harmful activity. In fact, one of the primary reasons for 
the existence of this remedy is to operate in precisely those cases in which 
restorative damages may be unavailable or, if available, inadequate to achieve 
optimal deterrence.151 
 
 147  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (“[A] penalty should be 
reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some 
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.”). 
 148  See, e.g., id. at 2621 (“[T]he consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but 
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] punitive damages award, instead of serving a compensatory purpose, 
serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction.”); 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“[T]he damages awarded [must] be reasonably 
necessary to vindicate the State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[S]ubstantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the 
case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.”); Grimshaw v. 
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Ct. App. 1981) (“The primary purposes of punitive damages are 
punishment and deterrence of like conduct by the wrongdoer and others.”). 
 149  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2633 (“[G]iven the need to protect against the 
possibility . . . of awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured 
retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio . . . is a fair upper limit in . . . maritime cases.”); Philip Morris USA, 
549 U.S. at 353 (prohibiting a jury from punishing a defendant for harm caused to non-party “strangers to the 
litigation,” even when such punishment may be necessary to achieve optimal levels of deterrence); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”). 
 150  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 397 & n.33 (noting that optimal punitive damages would 
require setting the “punitive multiple equal to the reciprocal of the enforcement error,” but that such an 
approach may be unconstitutional under Philip Morris USA v. Williams). 
 151  See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mathias, a case 
involving a motel infested with bedbugs, a punitive damages award of $186,000 was upheld, even though 
compensatory damages were only $5,000, in part because “[t]he defendant’s behavior was outrageous . . . and 
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Moving away from punitive damages, there are other areas in which the 
coercive interest plays an important role in structuring remedies.152 But 
perhaps nowhere is this truer than in the area of tort law, where law and 
economics scholars have advocated that the principle of deterrence (which I 
shall refer to more broadly as the principle of efficient coercion) reign over a 
wide range of civil wrongs.153 Perhaps nowhere is this principle better 
exemplified than in the Learned Hand formula. 
First formally set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,154 Judge 
Learned Hand rejected the traditional “reasonable man” standard that seemed 
to require a potential wrongdoer to view the law of negligence from the good 
 
at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of [the harm] was emotional.” Id. at 674, 677. 
Judge Posner, writing for the court, justified the high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in part by 
noting:  
The award of punitive damages in this case . . . serves the additional purpose of limiting the 
defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a 
tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be 
punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away. 
Id. at 677; see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Compensatory damages do not always 
compensate fully. Because courts insist that an award of compensatory damages have an objective basis in 
evidence, such awards are likely to fall short in some cases, especially when the injury is of an elusive or 
intangible character. . . . [P]unitive damages are necessary in such cases in order to make sure that tortious 
conduct is not underdeterred, as it might be if compensatory damages fell short of the actual injury inflicted by 
the tort.”). 
 152  See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (noting that Section 
4 of the Clayton Act is a “remedial provision” that, by allowing treble damages, plays “an important role in 
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing”); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 
U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (“[A] rule of liability which merely takes away the profits from an infringement would 
offer little discouragement to infringers.”); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that 
although “[i]t may seem wrong to penalize the infringer for his superior efficiency and give the owner a 
windfall,” this remedy “discourages infringement,” whereas a traditional award of compensatory damages 
would “not effectively deter this kind of forced exchange”); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling 
Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that the remedy of “accountings of profits would, by 
removing the motive for infringements, have the effect of deterring future infringements”). 
 153  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9, 
85–86 (1987) (noting that although “most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as 
the ideal function of tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand 
formula has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make explicit what 
had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”). 
 154  159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 153, at 9, 85–86 (observing 
that although “most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function of 
tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand formula has long been 
used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make explicit what had long been the 
implicit meaning of negligence”). 
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man’s internal point of view155 and provided the following external standard by 
which courts should determine whether or not a defendant had acted 
negligently: 
[An] owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against 
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability 
[of harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, [if the harm comes 
about]; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it 
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if 
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability 
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether 
B < PL.156 
 
 155  See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 144, at 749–50. Professor Kelley has noted that just as “[t]he critical 
question for Holmes . . . was not simple foreseeability by the ordinary reasonable man, but the specific laws of 
antecedence and consequence that enable us to foresee harm from certain conduct under certain 
circumstances,” so too did Judge Hand, a “friend and admirer of Holmes,” “refus[e] to include foreseeability in 
his simplified reformulation of the unreasonable foreseeable risk test.” Id. The result was a test that was “more 
scientific: you do not need to use that weaselly creature, the ordinary reasonable man, with his penchant for 
sentiment and outmoded custom, who may upset the purely objective calculation of costs and benefits.” Id. But 
see Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person 
Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817 (2001) (noting that, although the reasonable person test 
and the Hand formula can be thought of “as independent and alternative techniques for determining 
negligence,” the two can also be combined “by characterizing the Hand [f]ormula as the test a reasonable 
person would use in deciding which precautions to take to avoid accident risks to others”).  
 156  Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. As pointed out by Professor Kelley, “Judge Hand had expressed 
this same understanding of the appropriate test of negligence, without the algebraic notation, over six years 
before in Conway v. O’Brien.” Kelley, supra note 144, at 743; see also Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 
(2d Cir. 1940) (“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the 
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and 
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”), rev’d, 312 U.S. 492 (1941); 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding Ford to have engaged in cost-
benefit analysis in deciding whether to spend money to improve safety of Ford Pinto to reduce costs resulting 
from accident-related injuries and deaths); Kelley, supra note 144, at 754 (“Judge Posner recognized the 
Carroll Towing Co. negligence formula as ‘a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant 
to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among those factors’ even though ‘the formula does not 
yield mathematically precise results in practice, [since the burden of precautions, and the probability and 
potential gravity of harm have never all been quantified] in an actual lawsuit.’” (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th 
Cir. 1982))); Posner, supra note 13, at 32–33 (“Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic 
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability of 
occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to 
prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is what Hand meant by the burden of taking precautions against 
the accident. . . . If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is lower—exceeds the 
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic 
terms, to forgo accident prevention. A rule making the enterprise liable for the accidents that occur in such 
cases cannot be justified on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase the safety of its operations. 
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay 
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Under this approach, which appears in our common law157 and is reflected 
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts,158 a court need “merely calculate[] the 
costs and the benefits of an activity to decide whether an injurer [is] 
negligent,”159 and need not be concerned with determining what a 
reasonable160 person in a defendant’s position would have foreseen or whether 
 
tort judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 157  See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1037–38 (1991) 
(“[T]he process of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the cost of risk prevention has been embedded 
in negligence law since the nineteenth century, and was rendered official by the First Restatement of Torts and 
Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.” (footnote omitted)). But see Gilles, supra 
note 155, at 814 (arguing that although the Restatement (Third) of Torts has explicitly adopted the Hand 
formula, the cost-benefit approach of risk-utility balancing has been an implicit aspect of the reasonable person 
standard for seventy years); Kelley, supra note 144, at 752–53 (“Stephen Gilles has confirmed what this author 
had earlier suggested: judges ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to determine whether the actor 
behaved as a ‘reasonably prudent person’ or an ‘ordinary reasonable person.’ Judges do not ordinarily instruct 
juries on the negligence issue to balance the costs and benefits of greater care.” (footnotes omitted)); Kenneth 
W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2008) (“To be sure, there is much controversy about the descriptive claim that the 
Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort law. Jury instructions (except in some products liability cases) rarely 
refer to Hand balancing, and appellate decisions refer to such balancing only intermittently. Rather, 
‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ appears to be the (remarkably vague and opaque) ‘standard’ that 
many jurisdictions require juries to apply in determining negligence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 158  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not 
exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the 
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in 
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or 
reduce the risk of harm.”). It may have been the case, however, that Judge Learned Hand was himself 
influenced by the ALI’s Restatement project, rather than the other way around. See Kelley, supra note 144, at 
743–44 (“Where, then, did Judge Hand get his formula? We know from his biographers that Learned Hand 
was an intellectually ambitious and progressive judge, alive to the latest currents of thought in the legal 
community. This found expression in many ways, including Judge Hand’s early membership in the American 
Law Institute (ALI) and his vigorous support for its project of restating the common law. This suggests that a 
likely source for Hand’s description of the negligence standard would be the Restatement of the Division of 
the Law Relating to Negligence, approved by the ALI at its annual meeting in 1934. Sure enough, when we 
turn to that Restatement we find negligence explained as conduct posing an unreasonable foreseeable risk of 
harm to another. The Restatement defined an unreasonable risk as ‘one of such magnitude as to outweigh what 
the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.’ The Restatement went 
on to list factors to be considered in determining the utility of the actor’s conduct, as well as factors considered 
in determining the magnitude of the risk.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291 
(1939))); see also Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 387 (1992) 
(“The Restatement approach differs from the Hand test only in that it measures the burden and loss, factors in 
terms of social burden and loss rather than in terms of the burden and loss to the parties.”). 
 159  Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 383 
(1986).  
 160  Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern 
Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 591 (2002). But see POSNER, supra note 44, at 169–70 
(characterizing Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works as a case illustrating Baron Alderson’s economic 
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a tortfeasor’s actions were wrongful or not.161 Instead, a court need only 
determine which party is the “cheapest cost avoider”162 (i.e., “the actor who 
could most easily discover and inexpensively remediate the hazard”),163 and 
then place the cost of accident prevention on this person to encourage them to 
take only those precautions that are economically feasible.164 The extent to 
which judges actually operate this way, as a descriptive matter, is beyond the 
scope of this Article,165 but the fact that the coercive interest in general, and 
deterrence in particular, plays at least some role in the way judges think about 
remedies seems to be well established. 
Finally, the coercive interest also plays a prominent role in the area of 
coercive civil contempt. This remedy, which allows a judge to “punish a prior 
offense as well as coerce an offender’s future obedience,”166 is an extremely 
powerful tool, allowing the judge to coerce a contemnor to perform or refrain 
from performing some specified act by imposing a daily fine on the contemnor 
or, in extreme cases, to confine him or her until he or she complies with the 
judge’s order.167 Once the contemnor, who “carr[ies] the keys of [his] prison in 
[his] own pocket[],”168 performs or refrains from performing the specified act, 
the contempt is “purged,” and the coercive fine (or imprisonment), having 
 
understanding of the law of negligence, and remarking that although the injury was “of unprecedented 
severity,” the court did not find negligence because “[t]he damage was not so great as to make the expected 
cost of the accident greater than the cost of prevention” because “the probability [of the loss] had been low”). 
 161  Kelley & Wendt, supra note 160, at 591–92 (citing Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective 
Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2402–13 (1990)). 
 162  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119 (1972). 
 163  M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of 
Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (1998). 
 164  See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 155, at 818 (noting that “[t]he Hand Norm tells us that it is negligent to 
omit a precaution if the reduction in expected accident costs would have been greater than the costs of the 
precaution,” or, stated algebraically, “it is negligent to omit a precaution if PL > B”); Kelley & Wendt, supra 
note 160, at 591 (“[A]dvocates of the Carroll Towing Co. test have suggested that the ordinary reasonable 
person standard asks a cost-benefit question: whether the burden of taking precautions against a foreseeable 
risk is less than the foreseeable probability times the foreseeable gravity of threatened harm to others if the 
precautions are not taken.” (footnote omitted)). 
 165  Anecdotally, many examples can be provided in which judges both embrace and reject the coercive 
interest as an organizing remedial principle. Compare Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 
756, 760–61 (N.Y. 1986) (encouraging efficient breach by refusing to award specific performance in a contract 
governing the lease of a billboard), with Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948) 
(refusing to allow an efficient breach where one party “has deliberately broken his agreement”). 
 166  Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). 
 167  Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 120, 120 (1965). 
 168  In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
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achieved its objective, comes to an end.169 It is this power that distinguishes 
law “from mere social obligation,”170 and “[w]ithout the availability of civil 
contempt, the law as between private parties loses its coercive quality, and for 
all practical purposes becomes mere voluntarism rather than law.”171 
It is one thing to acknowledge that the coercive interest plays an important 
role in structuring our thinking about the way judges do (and ought to) award 
numerous remedies, but could this remedial interest serve to effectively 
organize all of our thinking about remedies, as some law and economics 
scholars might suggest? Here, the answer must be no. First, such a position 
would seem to undermine the restorative interest (quadrant I), in that it would 
deny a victim of wrongdoing a right to just compensation if such compensation 
were deemed unnecessary to deter a wrongdoer—or other members of society 
(including the victim)—from committing a similar wrongful act in the 
future.172 And second, the wholesale adoption of the coercive interest could 
also undermine the retributive interest (quadrant II), in that it could 
occasionally require a judge to punish an innocent party in a particularly 
newsworthy, high-profile case for the purpose of deterring others, all of which 
could help achieve a greater social good.173 For, as others have argued 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  Gwynn v. Gwynn, 530 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Alaska 1975) (Connor, J., dissenting). 
 171  Id. Justice Connor went on to note that “[t]he ability of one party to invoke the remedy of civil 
contempt is vital to the functioning of the legal order, as well as the effectuation of the particular rights which 
that party seeks to enforce.” Id. 
 172  In fact, it is an overreliance on quadrant III that has caused some law and economics scholars to submit 
proposals that either ignore, or are anathema to, the restorative interest (quadrant I). See, e.g., David Rosenberg 
& Steven Shavell, Essay, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (proposing 
to halve litigation costs while preserving effective deterrence by choosing only one half of all cases brought 
before a court to be litigated, while doubling the damages award for the victorious plaintiffs in those cases). 
 173  PINCOFFS, supra note 17, at 33 (noting that although the utilitarian “will punish when, and only 
when . . . there is likely to be less mischief than if he did not punish, or punished in some other way,” it will 
sometimes be the case that “the best way to minimize mischief would be to punish an innocent man”); see also 
id. at 34 (“Would not a consistent utilitarian judge sometimes be constrained by the principle of the 
minimization of mischief to make use of misplaced punishment for the reduction of crime? How, as a 
utilitarian, could he fail to punish [an innocent] man . . . if an example were needed?”). Pincoffs further 
explained that “[n]ot only . . . will the utilitarian judge occasionally punish the innocent, but also he will from 
time to time reward the guilty.” Id. at 37. This position, however, is untenable.  
To punish an innocent or reward a guilty man seems the very paradigm of injustice; and, to the 
extent that we value justice, we seem unable to accept the utilitarian position insofar as it bears 
on punishment. 
Even if it can be shown that the utilitarian judge would very seldom punish an innocent or 
reward a guilty man, he would not—we are sure—refrain on principle from such acts, for he has 
only one principle: the maximization of public happiness. Guided by this one principle he cannot 
but regard the prisoner before the bar as a possible lever for the public weal. But to make use of 
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previously, “it is the threat of punishment and not punishment itself which 
deters,” and so long as “men believe that punishment has occurred even if in 
fact it has not,”174 actual punishment of the wrongdoer would be unnecessary 
as the coercive interest will have accomplished its goals. 
Therefore, although the coercive interest plays an important role in the law 
of remedies175 and has been used by courts from time to time to justify extra-
compensatory remedies,176 its wholesale adoption seems impractical, in that it 
would not only require judges to punish wrongdoers more severely than 
warranted (based on the harm they have caused) for the sake of deterrence, but 
would allow society to sacrifice innocent parties on the altar of social justice 
for the sake of the greater good—a proposition that not only offends our 
notions of justice and fair play, but, to my knowledge, has not been accepted 
by any court. 
D. The Protective Interest 
Before turning to the protective interest itself, it will be useful to pause and 
summarize what we have covered thus far. We have seen that the restorative, 
retributive, and coercive interests can each be used to justify an assortment of 
remedies awarded by courts, and that each of these interests contains important 
clues about the way individual remedies are conceptualized and administered. 
We have also seen, however, that none of the theories we have discussed is 
capable, by itself, of uniting the kaleidoscope of remedies frequently 
 
prisoners in this opportunistic way is to ignore the demands of justice. This is the center of 
gravity of the argument [against utilitarianism]. 
Id. (emphasis omitted).  
It is important to note, of course, that just as the utilitarian criticisms of retributivism did not render 
utilitarianism true, so too is it that these retributivist criticisms of utilitarianism do not render retributivism 
true. See id. at 48. 
 174  Mabbott, supra note 39, at 152. 
 175  See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439–40 (2001) (“[C]itizens 
and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to 
deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; 
efficiency is just one consideration among many.” (alteration in original) (quoting Marc Galanter & David 
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 176  See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (awarding 
$5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages to guests bitten by bedbugs on the ground 
that “[t]he defendant’s behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight”); Grimshaw v. 
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Ct. App. 1981) (justifying punitive damages on the ground that “the 
manufacturer may find it more profitable to treat compensatory damages as a part of the cost of doing business 
rather than to remedy the defect”). 
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administered by judges under a single conceptual umbrella. If, as I have 
suggested, each remedy tends to advance the goals of one or more distinct 
remedial interests, each with its own temporal and personal perspective, does 
this mean that the legal realists have won after all, in that a judge is free to 
choose the remedial interest by which he or she will decide a case based on 
what he or she had for breakfast? 
Before answering this question, it is important to note that, up until now, 
we have mostly considered the three previous remedial interests in isolation, as 
though each remedy could be siloed and understood through a single privileged 
perspective. What we have seen, however, is that while each interest yields 
important clues about the remedial puzzle as a whole, each interest is, in the 
end, simply one piece of the larger remedial puzzle. Each piece, to be sure, 
reveals a great deal about the nature of a given remedy that ostensibly lies 
within its four corners, but necessarily leaves out important information 
contained in the surrounding pieces. Even more importantly, each piece, taken 
in isolation, tells us very little about the way the remedial puzzle should itself 
be put together. 
This final section to Part II, therefore, takes a slightly different approach. In 
addition to examining the protective interest—the fourth and final piece of the 
remedial puzzle—it spends some time exploring the conceptual space shared 
between and among each of the remedial interests previously discussed. In so 
doing, it is my hope that the law of remedies will be advanced in two important 
ways. First, such an approach will allow us to better understand perhaps the 
most important remedial interest (the protective interest) that, up until now, has 
been paid scant attention to by scholars and judges alike. Indeed, the 
identification of this interest alone could go a long way toward providing 
scholars and judges with a theoretically sound and juridically compelling 
justification upon which to base future remedial awards. Second, and perhaps 
even more importantly, by laying bare the relationship between and among all 
four remedial interests, it will be seen that all four remedial interests are 
invoked, to a greater or lesser extent, in the awarding of most remedies. Judges 
and policy makers who understand this relationship will not only better 
understand the effects of awarding a given remedy, but will also be able to 
fashion more complete and efficient remedies than would otherwise be 
possible, while better justifying those remedies that may appear, at first glance, 
to be either too harsh or too lenient. 
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With this background in mind, we are ready to turn our attention to the 
protective interest itself. Like the coercive interest, the protective interest is 
forward-looking, but unlike the coercive interest, the protective interest 
analyzes the wrong at issue from the potential victim’s (rather than 
wrongdoer’s) perspective. Perhaps the most commonly recognized protective 
remedy is the preventive injunction,177 which, like restorative remedies, 
focuses on the victim’s rights, but, unlike restorative remedies, aims to 
maintain the potential victim in his or her rightful position, rather than 
allowing the wrongdoer to harm the victim and then restoring the victim to his 
or her rightful position.178 
In this regard, the protective interest operates much like Calabresi and 
Melamed’s property rule, which requires “that someone who wishes to remove 
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction 
in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller,” whereas a 
remedy protected by, say, the restorative interest would operate according to 
their liability rule, which would only allow a wrongdoer to “destroy the initial 
entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.”179 
Although there is some truth to this statement, it seems strange to discuss how 
entitlements are protected, in a remedial context, before even defining what an 
entitlement is, in a rights-based context.180 
In Anglo-American law, at least, the decision between protecting a party 
with a property rule or a liability rule is governed by the long-standing 
“irreparable injury” rule.181 According to this rule, which has policed the 
divide between courts of law and courts of equity for half a millennium, courts 
only invoke the protective interest and grant an equitable injunction 
(preventing the victim from being harmed) in those instances where money 
damages would be inadequate to put the injured party back in the position he 
or she occupied prior to the injury.182 In theory, this rule allows wrongdoers to 
 
 177 Declaratory judgments are another important preventive remedy, in which courts help parties avoid 
future harm by declaring in advance how the law would apply to a potential future dispute. For an excellent 
article discussing the pros and cons of using declaratory judgments to prevent such disputes ex ante, rather 
than adjudicate them ex post, see Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2010).  
 178 See infra text accompanying notes 181–87. 
 179 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 162, at 1092. 
 180 An attempt to more precisely define the concept of entitlement, and explore the relationship between 
rights and remedies, will be taken up in a future article. 
 181 See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 37.  
 182 See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 356 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The 
very thing which makes an injury ‘irreparable’ is the fact that no remedy exists to repair it.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974). 
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infringe on a victim’s rights in the present so long as they are willing and able 
to pay money damages in the future.183 In practice, however, few courts allow 
a wrongdoing party to behave in such a manner—in spite of this well-settled 
rule,184 which seems to be honored more in the breach than in the observance. 
This insight can help shed light on each of the remedial interests previously 
discussed. 
Consider, for example, the case of Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co.,185 in 
which a landowner sought an injunction to prevent a company from cutting the 
timber on his land. Because the plaintiff’s timber had a readily ascertainable 
market value, and because the defendant was willing to pay this value after 
chopping down the wood, the irreparable injury rule (in addition to well-
established precedent) required that the court allow the defendant to chop 
down the plaintiff’s timber, leaving the plaintiff to recover only the restorative 
(and substitutionary) remedy of money damages.186 The court, albeit 
uncomfortably, even admitted as much.187 Yet, the judges understandably felt 
uneasy about the case and were uncomfortable applying the rule.188 Something 
seemed strange—even perverse—with allowing one party to run roughshod 
over a victim’s rights simply because that party could pay for the harm it 
caused.189 Something seemed wrong, in short, with protecting a plaintiff’s right 
with a liability rule rather than a property rule even though doing so would 
 
 183  See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at vii (“[C]ourts will not prevent harm if money damages could 
adequately compensate for the harm. [The rule] says that I am free to destroy your property as long as I can 
pay for it.”); see also HOLMES, supra note 31, at 236 (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is 
called compelling specific performance. But . . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one. The only universal 
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised 
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has 
gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”); Holmes, supra note 28, at 462 (“The duty to 
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and 
nothing else.”); supra Part II.A. 
 184  See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 23 (“Courts do not deny specific relief merely because they 
judge the legal remedy adequate. The irreparable injury rule almost never bars specific relief, because 
substitutionary remedies are almost never adequate. At the stage of permanent relief, any litigant with a 
plausible need for specific relief can satisfy the irreparable injury rule.”). 
 185  73 S.E. 82, 83 (W. Va. 1911). 
 186  See id. at 84 (“Our rule permits a mere trespasser to utterly destroy the forest of his neighbor, provided 
he is solvent and able to respond in damages to the extent of the value thereof.”). 
 187 See id. at 83 (“This appeal from an order dissolving an injunction awarded to prevent the cutting of 
timber on a tract of land . . . would necessarily and inevitably fail under a rule or principle often declared by 
this court, if we should adhere to it. Unless the trespass itself constitutes irreparable injury, none is 
shown . . . .”). 
 188 See id. (“However, [the irreparable injury] rule seems not to have commanded uniform approval by the 
public, nor by the members of the legal profession . . . .”). 
 189  See id. at 84. 
JIMENEZ GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:38 AM 
1354 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1309 
have not only satisfied the irreparable injury rule, but also would have 
comported with the restorative interest emphasized in Part II.A. 
Having decided to reject the irreparable injury rule (and the restorative 
remedy of money damages), upon what principle could a court base its 
decision? The retributive interest, discussed in Part II.B, seems inappropriate 
here because it would require that a wrongdoing party be retributively 
“punished” for the harm it caused, but here, one would have great difficulty 
characterizing any action taken by this court—before any harm has occurred—
as “punishment.”190 If, on the one hand, the court allowed the defendant to cut 
down the plaintiff’s trees on the condition that the defendant compensated the 
plaintiff, the court would have, in effect, granted the defendant the private right 
of eminent domain, by which the defendant could seize the trees on the 
plaintiff’s property so long as it paid the plaintiff his full market value. Only 
the most perversely creative use of language could characterize the granting of 
such a power as “punishment.” If, on the other hand, the court issued an 
injunction and prevented the defendant from taking what did not belong to it in 
the first place, it is once again all but impossible to see how even the most 
skilled lexicographer could twist the definition of retributive punishment to 
encompass such a remedy. Thus, like the restorative interest, the retributive 
interest, quite simply, is not equipped to deal well with cases in which the 
harm has not yet occurred and is therefore deficient when it comes to 
approaching remedies prospectively. 
Might the coercive interest provide a better solution? At first glance, the 
coercive interest, with its emphasis on approaching remedies from an ex ante 
perspective, seems well suited to the task. A court would simply need to 
determine whether allowing the defendant to chop down the plaintiff’s trees 
would result, on the one hand, in socially productive activity,191 in which case 
the court should allow this activity (by protecting the plaintiff’s right to his 
trees with a mere liability rule and allowing the defendant to engage in such 
activity in exchange for compensation to the plaintiff), or, on the other hand, in 
socially unproductive activity, in which case the court should disallow this 
activity (by protecting the plaintiff’s right to his timber with a property rule 
and thereby preventing the defendant from engaging in such activity without 
the plaintiff’s permission).192 
 
 190  See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 191  As would be the case, for example, where the defendant is able to put the trees to a higher valued use 
than the plaintiff could, perhaps in the form of construction-grade lumber. 
 192  See supra text accompanying note 133. 
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Upon closer examination, however, there are several problems with the 
coercive interest being applied in such a case. First, as an epistemological 
matter, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether the defendant or 
the court is in a better position than the plaintiff in determining how to put the 
plaintiff’s resources to their most socially productive use.193 There is, in other 
words, a significant risk of undercompensation in allowing anyone other than 
the plaintiff to determine how much or how little the plaintiff values a specific 
good or service. Second, there is something normatively troubling with the 
argument that it is ever justifiable to allow one party to take something 
belonging to another on account of it being efficient to do so.194 There are, 
after all, other principles besides efficiency with which society is justifiably 
concerned. And finally, as a descriptive matter, courts simply do not typically 
justify ex ante remedies (e.g., injunctive relief) on efficiency grounds, although 
it would be easy for them to do so. Courts do, however, frequently touch upon 
(and are guided by) the protective interest in more cases than might at first 
meet the eye, as we shall soon see. 
To illustrate this point, let us return once more to Pardee to see how the 
judges actually decided the case. I noted previously that the judges in Pardee 
felt uncomfortable allowing the defendant to cut the plaintiff’s trees, although 
governing law (i.e., the irreparable injury rule) seemed to not only allow—but 
require—this outcome.195 How, then, did the judges go about protecting the 
plaintiff’s property with more than a liability rule? The answer, it turns out, is 
by invoking language suggestive of the protective interest itself! 
Taking a decidedly ex ante, victim-centered approach to the problem, the 
court paid scant attention to the remedy required to make the plaintiff whole 
(restorative interest), the proportional punishment to be inflicted on the 
defendant to pay for its culpable wrong (retributive interest), or the coercion 
necessary to encourage or deter this defendant (or others) from engaging in 
socially productive or unproductive activities (coercive interest). Instead, the 
court spoke in terms of exercising its “preventive powers” to “protect and 
vindicate the right of an owner of property” by way of a property rule, which 
would not only ensure that the owner’s property would be “immune[] from 
 
 193  See, e.g., Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law 
Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59, 108 (2008). 
 194  See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 963–69 
(1982) (likening efficient breach of contract to efficient theft of property, and rejecting both on moral 
grounds). 
 195  See Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82, 84 (W. Va. 1911). 
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injury,” but would also protect a “fundamental principle[] 
of . . . jurisprudence” not sufficiently appreciated by the irreparable injury 
rule.196 
And although protective remedies have been treated as exceptional in our 
common law system, this manner of thinking is far from unusual: whenever the 
restorative, retributive, or coercive interest seem incapable of effectively 
dealing with the remedial problem at hand, courts often invoke the logic—if 
not the words—underlying the protective interest to justify their remedial 
choices.197 This often happens whenever the threatened harm can be prevented, 
regardless of the irreparable injury rule,198 and is frequent whenever the 
defendant’s wrongdoing appears to be intentional. And this is true in numerous 
areas of the law ranging from remedies for breach of contract199 to unjust 
enrichment200 to encroachment.201 So why does the ostensibly exceptional 
protective interest seem to have such wide-ranging scope? In short, as this 
Article argues in the next section, it is because each of the other three remedial 
interests we have discussed tend to move toward bringing about the ends of the 
protective interest. Indeed, although courts generally tend to think about 
remedies in terms of restoration, retribution, or coercion, the remedies they 
award, in some measure or other, help bring about the aims of protection. This 
emphasis on protecting rights, though rarely expressed, was perhaps best 
summed up by the court in Pradelt v. Lewis,202 which noted that “the duty of 
 
 196  Id. at 83–85. 
 197  See, e.g., Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122–23 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(repeatedly emphasizing the need to “protect” trademark owner from “deliberate” infringement); Campbell 
Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948) (acknowledging the irreparable injury rule but 
simultaneously finding that there is “no reason why a court should be reluctant to grant specific relief when it 
can be given without supervision of the court or other time-consuming processes against one who has 
deliberately broken his agreement”); U.C.C. § 2-609 official cmt. 1 (2011) (“[T]he essential purpose of a 
contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a 
promise plus the right to win a lawsuit . . . .”). 
 198  See supra note 183.  
 199  See supra notes 85, 95, 98–99, 197 (discussing increased remedies for deliberate breaches of 
contracts). 
 200  See supra text accompanying notes 99–128 (discussing increased remedies for deliberate unjust 
enrichment cases). 
 201  See, e.g., Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. 1959) (stating that injunctions are only typically 
issued in accidental encroachment cases after weighing such factors as the “expense and difficulty of removing 
an encroachment in relation to the damage resulting therefrom, or the benefit that would accrue from its 
removal”). However, “where the encroachment was intentional, in that [the] defendant proceeded despite 
notice or warning, or where he failed to take proper precautions . . . the courts . . . have refused to balance the 
equities, and have issued the mandatory injunction without regard to the relative convenience or hardship 
involved.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 202  130 N.E. 785 (Ill. 1921). 
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the courts is to protect rights, and innocent complainants cannot be required to 
suffer the loss of their rights because of expense to the wrongdoer.”203 This 
thinking lay beneath the surface of much of our remedies jurisprudence, 
although it is not always so explicitly expressed. 
E. Summary 
Thus far, I have shown that the law has come a long way since the days of 
Charles Alan Wright, whose judges had “no place where [they could] find the 
whole [law of remedies] put in perspective,” but were left to comb through 
treatises governing “Damages, Equity, Specific Performance, Injunction, 
Quasi-Contracts, Rescission, Declaratory Judgments, Restitution, and perhaps 
others”204 whenever they had to decide a remedial problem. While things are 
certainly better today, the law of remedies still lacks an overarching 
organizational structure, although, as I have argued, much structure is provided 
by way of the four remedial interests outlined above. By thinking about 
remedies in terms of these interests, each of which emphasizes a unique 
temporal and personal perspective, judges can better structure remedies by 
thinking about them in terms of the remedial goals they wish to achieve. 
I have also shown, however, that no single remedial interest can (or should) 
be used, as a general matter, to decide all remedies cases. Instead, recourse to 
all four remedial interests (and especially the protective interest) is needed to 
make sense of the numerous (and varied) remedial problems arising in our 
courts’ dockets on a daily basis. 
III.  REMEDIAL CONSILIENCE: UNIFYING THE FOUR REMEDIAL INTERESTS 
Up to this point, I have presented each remedial interest as offering a 
unique vantage point through which one may view the law of remedies in 
general and the numerous remedies awarded by judges on a daily basis. But, as 
suggested in Part I of this Article, these interests do not stand alone, but are 
related to one another in a predictable fashion, which may help judges think 
more clearly about the remedial goals underlying all remedies. Therefore, this 
Part briefly examines the relationship between and among the four remedial 
interests and shows how the choice (consciously or otherwise) to view 
remedies through a specific remedial lens not only fails to take into account 
 
 203  Id. at 787 (quoting Gulick v. Hamilton, 122 N.E. 537, 540 (Ill. 1919)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 204  Wright, supra note 1, at 376.  
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important remedial consequences that are too often ignored, but (even more 
importantly) also fails to take into account the purpose toward which all 
remedies are—and ought to be—naturally directed: the protection and 
preservation of the victim’s rights. 
A. The Four Remedial Interests in an Ideal World 
Let us begin by imagining a fictitious society, Law Land, composed of four 
individuals: Wrongdoer, Victim, Judge, and Observer. Suppose that Judge 
(who we might think of along the lines of Orwell’s “Big Brother”) follows 
Wrongdoer and Victim’s every move, and has perfect knowledge of the 
goings-on in her society. Observer, meanwhile, mostly minds his own 
business, but is curious about how Wrongdoer, Victim, and Judge interact. 
Suppose that one day, Victim, upon information and belief, comes to learn 
that Wrongdoer intends to steal his shovel. Assume further that later that day, 
Wrongdoer in fact steals, and accidentally breaks, Victim’s shovel, which is 
valued at $20. Victim, upon learning that his shovel is missing, immediately 
sues Wrongdoer.205 The matter comes before Judge, who, drawing upon her 
perfect knowledge of the goings-on in her society, correctly determines that 
Victim’s shovel has gone missing due to Wrongdoer’s deliberate actions and 
not, for example, from Victim’s own carelessness in misplacing the shovel. 
Judge, therefore, decides to issue an award in Victim’s favor and returns to her 
chambers to set about writing her opinion. Upon what grounds shall she justify 
her remedy? 
One answer, of course, and that most frequently used by judges today, is 
that she is likely to take an ex post, victim-oriented view and justify the 
remedy by way of the restorative interest.206 Putting pen to paper, she begins to 
write: 
“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, 
as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not 
been for the wrong of the other party.”207 Here, had it not been for 
Wrongdoer’s actions, Victim would have had a shovel, valued at $20, 
so this court therefore finds that Wrongdoer shall pay Victim $20. 
 
 205  Like ours, theirs is a litigious society. 
 206  See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958). 
 207  Id. 
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Judge looks upon her work with some satisfaction, and, giving the matter 
more thought, it occurs to her that the $20 will not come from a money tree, 
but must be paid by Wrongdoer. Thus, Judge realizes that what will feel like 
restoration to Victim will feel like retribution to Wrongdoer.208 Following our 
definition of retributive punishment above,209 Wrongdoer will feel both that (a) 
he is being punished for breaching a legally recognized duty, and (b) that the 
quantum of punishment has been exacted in proportion to the grievousness of 
Wrongdoer’s wrong. Therefore, Judge realizes that her opinion can also be 
justified on retributive grounds. To explain this, Judge takes out a fresh sheet 
of paper and begins to write: 
The fundamental principle of retribution is to punish the wrongdoing 
party, as nearly as possible, in proportion to the grievousness of his 
harm.210 Wishing neither to punish Wrongdoer too little or too much 
for his actions, the court determines that an appropriate punishment 
shall be $20, which will take from Wrongdoer the dollar equivalent 
of what Wrongdoer himself has taken from Victim. 
Judge is pleased by the equivalence between the two monetary awards, 
although the justifications used are quite different. On the one hand, it strikes 
Judge as uncanny that an award punishing Wrongdoer should be the same as 
an award compensating Victim because she can recall many cases in which 
other judges struggled to draw a firm line between compensation and 
punishment.211 On the other hand, she is satisfied that she can kill two remedial 
birds with one legal stone, so to speak, and compensate Victim while 
punishing Wrongdoer without having to choose between the principles of 
restoration and retribution. 
Just as she is about to publish her decision, it occurs to Judge that perhaps 
she is taking too narrow a view of the problem. Judge recalls that Observer, 
always curious about the goings-on in Law Land, will soon read her decision, 
which will itself create a precedent by which Observer will feel justified to act. 
 
 208  In a somewhat different form, this point has been recognized by our nation’s highest court. See, e.g., 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“Compensatory damages . . . already 
contain [a] punitive element.”). 
 209  See supra Part II.B. 
 210  See supra note 47. 
 211  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that 
punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution . . . .”); see also 1B COMM. ON PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW YORK PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2:278 (3d ed. 2013) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate 
the plaintiff but to punish the defendant . . . .”). 
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“Perhaps,” she thinks to herself, “rather than compensating Victim or 
punishing Wrongdoer, what I should be doing is ensuring that Wrongdoer and 
others who learn of Wrongdoer’s punishment, such as Observer, no longer 
engage in such activities again. What remedy,” she wonders, “would best 
accomplish this goal?” 
Recalling her training in law and economics, Judge remembers that the best 
remedy would not only leave the victim indifferent between not being injured, 
on the one hand, and being injured plus being compensated, on the other,212 
but, where the goal is deterrence, as it is here, it would ensure that Wrongdoer 
(and others, like Observer, who learn of Wrongdoer’s punishment) will have 
no incentive to engage in such socially unproductive activities in the future.213 
Because Judge has at her disposal the means to detect every wrong in her 
society,214 she quickly realizes that an award of $20 will make Victim 
indifferent between no injury, on the one hand, and injury plus $20, on the 
other, and will likewise ensure that Wrongdoer no longer has any incentive to 
steal Victim’s shovel.215 In Law Land, therefore, $20 again seems to be the 
perfect remedy. 
At this point, Judge realizes that it must be more than mere coincidence that 
the restorative, retributive, and coercive interest all point to the same $20 
remedy. Further, Judge realizes that, in the case before her, her decision to 
invoke any one of these remedial interests would have worked just as well to 
protect any of the other remedial interests just discussed, and would even have 
helped protect Victim from future harmful acts (the protective interest) by 
removing Wrongdoer’s (and Observer’s) incentive to steal Victim’s property in 
the future. 
Judge begins to consider, however, exactly how Victim would be protected. 
If she writes an opinion announcing that $20 shall be the fine for any future 
theft of Victim’s shovel, Wrongdoer (and Observer) would have no incentive 
to steal the item, assuming they could go elsewhere and purchase the shovel 
 
 212  See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 491 (“Perfect compensation is a sum of money that 
leaves the victim indifferent between the injury with compensation or no injury.”). 
 213  More formally, “[s]ocially optimal deterrence occurs at the point where the marginal social cost of 
reducing crime further equals the marginal social benefit.” Id. at 512.  
 214  We will also assume, for the time being, that it is costless for the judge to do so, an assumption that 
will be revised momentarily. 
 215  This is because the wrongdoer will immediately be detected, and will be required to either give the 
shovel back to the victim, where the shovel is available, or pay its dollar equivalent to the victim ($20), before 
the wrongdoer is able to put the shovel to productive use. The wrongdoer’s actions, in other words, would be 
entirely pointless. 
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for $20, its fair market value. Why? Because the Judge would detect the 
transgression and then force Wrongdoer (or Observer, should he, too, become 
a wrongdoer) to pay $20 to Victim. Wrongdoer, in other words, would be 
indifferent between stealing Victim’s shovel and paying $20 in damages, and 
purchasing a shovel from the store for $20. 
Pondering this, Judge is overcome by a terrible insight: she realizes that, 
although her decision would make Wrongdoer indifferent between stealing 
Victim’s shovel (and paying $20 in damages) and purchasing a shovel from the 
store for $20, Wrongdoer would only be indifferent between these two acts! 
This means that Wrongdoer is likely to do whatever is most convenient in the 
situation he finds himself in at any given time. When Wrongdoer is close to the 
store when overcome by a desperate urge to own a shovel, which will happen, 
say, 50% of the time, Wrongdoer will purchase the shovel. But when 
Wrongdoer is close to Victim when overcome by the same desperate urge to 
own a shovel, which will happen the other 50% of the time, Wrongdoer will 
steal the shovel and pay damages to Victim. To protect Victim’s rightful 
position, therefore, Judge will have to do something more than just deter 
Wrongdoer, which can only be accomplished by setting the price of the remedy 
above the level at which Wrongdoer is indifferent. 
Thinking back on this exercise, Judge realizes that these remedial interests 
do not operate in isolation, but that the pursuit of one juridical interest leads 
logically to the advancement of other remedial goals. In short, she notices that 
choosing one remedial interest (e.g., restoration) does not exclude—but 
necessarily entails—the pursuit of other remedial interests (e.g., protection). 
Further, Judge recognizes an important pattern to this relationship: whereas 
restoration requires that Wrongdoer pay a sum of money to Victim, enforcing 
the award requires retributively punishing Wrongdoer. In addition, Judge 
recognizes that enforcing the retributive interest by punishing Wrongdoer will 
also operate to deter not only Wrongdoer, but others, such as Observer, who 
learn about Wrongdoer’s punishment, thus invoking the coercive interest. And 
finally, Judge realizes that coercing others will have the effect of preventing, to 
some extent, harm to Victim, such that employing the coercive interest will 
have the effect of also invoking the protective interest. She notices, in effect, 
that there is a clear line running from the restorative interest to the retributive 
interest to the coercive interest to the protective interest, per Figure 3 below. 
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FIGURE 3: THE REMEDIAL PATHWAY 
 




















In contemplating this diagram, Judge wonders why, if these relationships 
among the remedial interests hold in the real world, so many other judges, in 
the course of deciding a case, go out of their way to declare that they have 
chosen a particular remedy for its ability to accomplish one part of a remedial 
goal (e.g., awarding money damages to compensate the victim) at the expense 
of—and while going out of their way to disclaim that they are furthering—
another part of a different remedial goal (e.g., punishing the wrongdoer)?216 
Judge also worries about the inadequate protection that is indirectly given 
to the protective interest when other remedial goals take center stage. 
Pondering these questions, Judge attempts to recall some of the less perfect 
societies she has studied—societies in which the bad guy is not always caught, 
or caught but not prosecuted, or prosecuted but not found liable, or found liable 
but unable (or unwilling) to pay, or where the thing that gets stolen or 
destroyed (e.g., Victim’s shovel) cannot always be valued (as with an 
heirloom) or replaced (as with the loss of human life). In such messy worlds, 
what is the relationship between and among the remedial interests previously 
discussed? 
B. The Four Remedial Interests in an Imperfect World 
To examine this relationship, Judge conjures up the following test case. 
Suppose a large auto manufacturer wants to offer an affordable subcompact car 
and is presented with two choices. First, the company can place the fuel tank 
above the car’s rear axle, which will increase the car’s safety by providing 
 
 216  See supra Part II.  
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additional crunch space in the event of a rear-end collision, but will reduce the 
available trunk space which will, in turn, decrease overall sales. Second, the 
company can place the fuel tank behind the rear axle of the car, which will 
reduce the car’s crunch space (and, therefore, its overall safety) by causing the 
gas tank to explode in the event of a rear-end collision. It is estimated that 
about 180 drivers will suffer agonizing burn deaths, and about another 180 will 
suffer agonizing burn injuries, but due to the increase in overall trunk space, 
many consumers (not knowing about this defect) will buy such a car, which 
will increase the company’s overall sales. 
Suppose further that the company, about to select the second option, learns 
that all of these deaths and injuries can be prevented by reinforcing the 
automobiles at a cost of a few extra dollars per automobile. Employing 
Learned Hand’s basic formula, B < PL, the company calculates that each death 
will cost the company $200,000, and each burn injury will cost the company 
$67,000. Because 180 individuals are expected to suffer each type of injury, 
the company multiplies 180 by $267,000, and calculates that the total cost to 
the company from the deaths and injuries that will be caused if the repairs are 
not undertaken will be roughly $50 million. Having calculated PL, the 
company still needs a figure for B. The repairs, it is learned, will cost the 
company around $137 million. Plugging this amount into B, the company 
realizes that it will not be found negligent if it undertakes the repairs; however, 
it nevertheless realizes that, from an economic point of view, it should not 
undertake the repairs, because it could earn an additional $87 million by 
manufacturing the defective cars (which will sell for an additional $137 
million) while paying out damages of $50 million. Not surprisingly, the 
company elects not to have the repairs made.217 
In such a situation, what now would be the relationship between and among 
the remedial interests? Beginning first with the restorative interest, Judge 
 
 217  This “hypothetical” case is based loosely on the facts of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. See 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 348, 384 (Ct. App. 1981) (“There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design 
defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit 
analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.”); see also Barbara Ann White, Risk-
Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 
77, 131 n.279 (1990) (“In making its cost-benefit analysis, Ford used the figures calculated by the National 
Highway Traffic and Safety Association to be the value of human life ($200,000) and serious burn injury 
($67,000). Using an estimation of 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries per year, Ford calculated that 
the benefits that would be realized by adding safety devices to the Pinto’s fuel tank, in terms of lives saved and 
injuries prevented, would equal approximately $50 million dollars, whereas the associated costs would be 
$137 million dollars.”). 
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imagines a case in which a victim is severely burned in a horrible crash, and 
the company is forced to pay $67,000 in compensatory damages. If we assume 
that $67,000 is truly compensatory, at least to the extent such compensatory 
remedies can be said to actually “restore,” either in-kind or substitutionarily, 
the victim to the position they occupied ex ante, what can we say about the 
effect of such an award on the other remedial interests? 
Even putting aside the fact that the company’s actions may entitle the 
victim to a separate award of punitive damages,218 Judge realizes that the 
restorative remedy of $67,000 does, to some extent, also punish the wrongdoer 
for the harm it has caused because the $67,000 going to the victim is coming 
out of the company’s coffers, and, as such, bears a proportional relationship to 
the harm it has caused this victim. So far, this is just a mirror image of the 
shovel example above, where the $20 paid to Victim (restoration) was the 
same $20 paid by Wrongdoer (retribution). Due to the messiness of the real 
world, however, and unlike the shovel example above, Judge realizes that other 
similarly situated victims may be injured in accidents for which the company is 
not sued (perhaps because the victim never learned that the accident was due, 
in large part, to a manufacturer’s design defect). Or, perhaps, Judge realizes 
that the company may be sued but, due to judicial error, found not liable. Or, 
carrying this line of thought further, the company may be sued, and found 
liable, but win on appeal. Or, taking the case further still, the victim might sue, 
the company might be found liable, the victim might win on appeal, but the 
company may become bankrupt before the victim is paid. 
Judge realizes, in other words, that although a restorative remedy will, to 
some extent, further the ends of the retributive interest, it will only do so 
indirectly and may not do so at all if any of the intervening factors discussed 
above are present. It is unlikely, in other words, that the retributive interest will 
be given full effect without a court specifically taking it into account. 
Turning to the retributive interest, Judge notices another interesting 
phenomenon. Due to enforcement error, cost of detection, etc., a fully 
retributive remedy, which would cause the wrongdoer to fully pay for the harm 
it has caused (but no more), will have some deterrent value, to be sure, but will 
not achieve the level of optimal deterrence sought by the coercive interest. 
 
 218  This, in fact, is what happened in the actual case. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (“There was 
ample evidence to support a finding of malice and Ford’s responsibility for malice.”); id. at 391 (“Here, the 
judge, exercising his independent judgment on the evidence, determined that a punitive award of 3½ million 
dollars was ‘fair and reasonable.’”).  
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To see why, let us return to our simple hypothetical in which Wrongdoer 
stole Victim’s $20 shovel. In an imperfect world, Wrongdoer’s chance of 
getting caught will not be 100%, as we previously assumed, but something 
much lower—say 50%. Therefore, Wrongdoer, in deciding whether to steal 
Victim’s shovel or purchase his own, will take into account his chance of being 
caught, along with the damages he will have to pay if caught. Wrongdoer 
reasons that one half of the time he will be caught and be required to either 
return the shovel to Victim or pay $20 in damages. But the other half of the 
time, Wrongdoer will get away with his theft and will realize a gain of $20. On 
average, therefore, each theft will cost Wrongdoer $10 in damages (0.5 × $20 
= $10), but because each theft will yield a total of $20, he will, on average, 
realize a profit of $10 per theft ($20 − $10 = $10). Because theft is, on average, 
profitable to Wrongdoer, pure retributive punishment will not adequately deter 
him from engaging in this particular wrongful activity.219 For the same reason, 
retributive punishment will not adequately deter the car manufacturer from 
putting out a defective product, as only a portion of its defective cars will 
malfunction, its fault will only be detected in a portion of those malfunctions, it 
will only be sued in a portion of such detected malfunctions, it will only lose a 
portion of those cases in which it is sued, etc. To be sure, retributive 
punishment does provide some deterrence, but the amount of deterrence it 
provides is far from optimal. 
Thus, after considering the coercive interest, Judge realizes that the only 
way to optimally deter the potential wrongdoer from engaging in such 
activities is to put herself in the wrongdoer’s shoes and ensure that the net 
benefit to the wrongdoer from engaging in such activities would be zero. 
Returning to the theft example, this can be done by multiplying the damages 
award by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement. There, because the 
thief will only be caught stealing the shovel 50% of the time, we must multiply 
the damages award ($20) by the reciprocal of 50% (or 200%), which means 
that one can only optimally deter Wrongdoer by requiring the thief to pay $40 
each time he is caught. By doing so, we would exceed what is called for under 
the principle of retributive punishment, but would realize the goals of the 
coercive interest by removing from Wrongdoer any incentive he might have 
had to engage in such deleterious behavior. This is so because although each 
successful theft will still gain him $20, he must now pay $40 when he is 
caught, and, because he is caught 50% of the time, he will recognize, on 
 
 219  This example is based loosely on an example provided by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen in their 
excellent book. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 493. 
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average, a profit of $0 per theft.220 In addition to accounting for the probability 
of the wrongdoer being caught, a successful coercive remedy would also take 
into account other factors such as: the probability of the victim bringing a 
lawsuit, the probability of the victim winning the lawsuit, the probability of the 
victim being successful on appeal, the probability of the wrongdoer being 
liquid, etc.221 
Finally, turning to the protective interest itself, Judge will recognize that 
optimal deterrence will provide some measure of protection to potential 
victims, but, as discussed previously,222 will by no means ensure that potential 
victims receive the same level of protection they would have if Judge focused 
on the protective interest directly. This is so for several reasons. First, as 
previously discussed, a perfect coercive remedy would make Wrongdoer 
indifferent between two acts, but, all things equal, would not protect Victim 
more than 50% of the time.223 And second, one need only recall that the 
coercive interest is concerned only with optimally deterring wrongdoers from 
engaging in socially unproductive acts, which therefore allows wrongdoers to 
engage in those activities in which the wrongdoer can internalize (i.e., pay for) 
his external harms. The Learned Hand formula discussed earlier, for example, 
embodies this approach.224 But victims, who place a different value on harms 
done to them than would a wrongdoer or court, would undoubtedly require a 
much higher price to be paid to ensure they were adequately protected. They 
would want, in other words, to be protected with a property rule rather than a 
liability rule, and judges would have to determine not how to optimally deter 
the wrongdoer, but how to optimally protect the victim, which will require 
doing something more than merely making the wrongdoer indifferent between 
committing and not committing the wrongful act.225 It will require affording 
the victim a certain measure of protection consistent with the importance of the 
 
 220  He will gain, in other words, $20 when he is not caught, which will happen 50% of the time, and will 
lose $40 when he is caught, which will also happen 50% of the time, requiring the thief to return the $20 from 
his initially successful theft along with the $20 (or the shovel) from the subsequently unsuccessful theft. 
 221  An ideal coercive remedy (in terms of achieving perfect or optimal deterrence) will multiply all of 
these probabilities with one another, and will then force the thief to pay the reciprocal of these joint 
probabilities multiplied by the damages caused. 
 222  See supra Part III.A. 
 223  Recall that if Wrongdoer must pay the same amount (e.g., $20) whether he steals the shovel and pays 
damages to Victim, or purchases the shovel from a store, we can expect Wrongdoer to engage in whichever act 
is most convenient to him at the time. Wrongdoer will therefore engage in each act roughly 50% of the time. 
 224  See supra note 164. 
 225  See supra Part III.A. 
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right at stake, which will itself require much more careful consideration by 
academics, judges, and policy makers than there is scope for in this Article. 
C. A Reprise 
Returning momentarily to Figure 3, we should not be surprised that 
remedies designed to achieve one remedial purpose may have indirect effects 
on other important public policy goals. After all, other scholars have attempted 
to bring closer together the remedial views of corrective justice and law and 
economics for some time.226 What is new, and at least somewhat surprising, is 
that there is an orderly and predictable relationship between and among these 
remedial relationships, so that the awarding of any particular remedy will fall 
within the scope of one of the four remedial interests, and that this interest will, 
in turn, move steadily and predictably toward the one remedial interest that has 
been underdeveloped and underappreciated in the literature: the protective 
interest. This interest, in turn, has the ability to descriptively unite what might 
otherwise seem like idiosyncratic remedies accomplishing wildly different 
remedial goals and to normatively provide a foundation upon which all 
remedies might be based. 
That all remedies move toward the protective interest, I believe, is no 
accident, though the question really to be answered is this: what, exactly, is it 
that the protective interest is protecting? If the answer turns out to be that the 
protective interest is protecting some right belonging to the victim, as I believe 
it is, then the more interesting question becomes: what is the nature of the 
relationship between rights and remedies more generally? Unfortunately, such 
inquiries must await exploration in a future article. For the time being, 
however, it is enough to recognize the ubiquity (if not primacy) of the 
protective interest in all remedial awards, and to ask judges to consider more 
carefully the remedial category into which a plaintiff’s desired remedy 
 
 226  See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 32, at 17 (“In the classical economic view, the function of 
compensatory damages is to force law violators to take account of the harm they inflict. If damage liability is 
less than the harm inflicted, potential defendants will violate the law when it is inefficient to do so. If damage 
liability exceeds the harm inflicted, potential defendants will obey the law when it is inefficient to do so. 
Damages should be set exactly equal to harms inflicted, and then, if the expected profit from a tort or breach of 
contract exceeds the expected damages, the actor should go ahead.”); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, 
at 390 (“[The] concept of perfect compensation, based on indifference, is fundamental to an economic account 
of incentives. If potential injurers are liable for perfectly compensatory damages, then they will internalize the 
external harm caused by accidents. And this creates incentives for the potential injurers to take efficient 
precaution.”). 
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belongs, and the effect that awarding this remedy will have on other remedial 
interests, especially on the protection of victim’s rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that all remedies fit into one of four distinct 
remedial categories and serve to further one of four distinct remedial interests. 
After outlining and discussing each of these interests (the restorative, 
retributive, coercive, and protective interests), it has explored the relationship 
between and among these interests, and has argued that all remedies, no matter 
the remedial category to which they originally belonged, work to further the 
goals of an interest previously paid scant attention to by scholars and judges 
alike: the protective interest. This Article has also shown that this interest, 
though it tends to be the most neglected of the remedial interests, may actually 
be the most basic and important. Further, the protective interest may itself 
provide important insights regarding the ultimate nature of the relationship 
between rights and remedies, to be explored in a follow-up article. 
